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Faculty of Business and Economic Sciences

Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University

Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape, South Africa

Telephone: +27(41) 504 4607 / 2906

Electronic Mail:

rosalind.petrakis@nmmu.ac.za

naas.ferreira@nmmu.ac.za

Web Address:

<http://jdl.nmmu.ac.za>

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THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN SADC COUNTRIES: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

B.C. Chikulo¹

ABSTRACT

Local governance reforms have been transforming the structure of local governance in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region. Since the 1990s, the critical objective of the reforms has been to democratise and institutionalise local governance. The objective of the reforms has been to improve institutional effectiveness, accountability and service delivery at the local level, especially in the rural areas. To this end, much has been achieved in terms of institutional legal and policy frameworks. However, the common problem that has been confronting all these reform initiatives is the question of the role and status of traditional authority leadership in the democratised local governance system. In this context, the reality in all SADC countries is that, subject to their relationship with the central government, traditional authorities and their leadership do have some role and status within the new democratic local governance. To this end, they exercise some local government functions, ranging from provision of services to allocation of tribal land which is generally held in trust, and, in some instances, preservation of law and order. The recurrent question, however, has been one of how to create an appropriate institutional mechanism for their involvement in order to enable them to effectively assist in the development process at the local level. The article examines the extent to which the traditional authorities and their leadership have been accommodated in the formal local governance system and what their role and status is in the municipal delivery system and development initiatives.

Keywords: Traditional leaders; traditional authorities; democratic local governance; rural areas.

INTRODUCTION

For the past three decades the Southern African Development Community region (SADC) has been witnessing local governance reform (Chikulo, 2006, 2010). These reforms which have been labelled “democratic decentralization” by scholars (Ribot, 2004; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004) have been transforming the structure of local governance in the SADC region. The major objective of the reforms has been not only to improve the institutional effectiveness and service delivery but also to democratise local governance. Thus the issue of democratising local governance and municipalisation lies at the core of the SADC vision.

However, a recurring issue in most of these countries is the role and status of traditional authorities and their leadership in the new democratic local governance. During the colonial era, traditional authorities and their leadership were assigned powers either in competition with or directly over elected local authorities (Ray *et al*, 1997). In the immediate post-independence era, the democratisation of local government undermined the political control of traditional authorities, with traditional leaders resisting the loss of their considerable power to control access

¹Professor B.C. Chikulo, Department of Development Studies, North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa.

to resources (land, water, livelihoods) to arbitration mechanisms and to social services such as education and health. The critical issue facing the governments in the SADC region is how to transform the institution of traditional authority inherited from the colonial era into a dynamic institution of local governance. This article reviews the extent to which the traditional authorities and their leadership have been accommodated in the democratic local governance system and what their role and status is in Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Local governance reform and the legal recognition accorded to traditional authorities have not only raised the debate of how traditional authorities should participate in local governance but also re-invigorated and given traditional leadership a new lease of life (Ntsebeza, 1999). As a result, traditional leaders in Namibia, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa have increasingly sought to reassert their authority (Ribot, 2002). In most countries this has resulted in competing claims and contestation over power by traditional leaders and the new democratically elected local governance institutions. Traditional leaders feel that their authority has been undermined by the transfer of control over allocation of resources such as land and other legitimate powers to the new democratic local authorities. Traditional leaders have therefore demanded an active role in democratically elected institutions, especially in rural areas (Jones, 2000). Consequently, traditional leaders are re-emerging as a political force against what they perceive to be a diminution of their role which the new democratic local governance has reinforced and institutionalised.

At the core of the debate is the compatibility of traditional leadership with new elected democratic local governance. The question has been one of how to create an appropriate mechanism for the involvement of traditional leadership in democratic local governance in order to enable them to participate effectively in the development process at the critical local level. Reconciling traditional authorities and their leadership with the new democratic local governance has thus become a major contentious issue in most SADC countries (Ndiyepa, 2001; Reddy & Naidu, 2007).

LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS

During the colonial era, the colonial state utilised the traditional authorities and leadership administratively and politically in their various rural local government systems (Keulder, 1998; Mamdani, 1996).

The following section provides an overview of the legal position of traditional authorities and leadership in Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Botswana

Contemporary democratic local governance in Botswana has evolved from traditional authorities. Local governance was introduced in 1956 with the establishment of tribal councils under the chairmanship of the chiefs (Sharma, 2003). The tribal councils consisted of members nominated by the chiefs and some elected by *kgotla* (village assembly). These councils performed limited local government functions. Falling under the tribal councils were second-tier district councils which were subordinate to the tribal councils. At independence in 1966, tribal authorities and their leadership were well established in rural areas and their popularity as part of society and cultural phenomena was very high (Dusing, 2002: 177).

After independence, the traditional authorities were given recognition and authority by Constitution of Botswana of 1966 (L.N. 83 of 1966) and the various Acts of Parliament including the Chieftainship Act, the Customary Courts Act, the Common Law and Customary Law Act, the Tribal Territories Act, the Chieftainship Act, the Customary Courts Act, the Tribal Territories Act, the Local Police Act, the Stock Theft Act, the Marriage Act, the Succession Act,

the Children's Act, the Adoption of Children Act, the Circumcision and Initiation Rites Act, the Affiliation Proceedings Act, and the House of Chiefs (Powers and Privileges) Act.

After independence the traditional leaders, although reluctant to surrender their powers and influence to the new structures, lost many of their powers to the district councils and land boards. The Traditional Authorities Act, 1995 (Act 17 of 1995) specifically excludes traditional leaders from political office, thereby reducing their previous traditional and colonial status from that of political leaders to that of cultural and development agents (Mahlangueni, 2005: 65). As a result the relationships between traditional authorities and new local democratic local governance institutions were strained (Vengroff, 1985: 113). However, the Presidential Commission on Local Government Structure (Venson Commission) which presented its report in 2001 recommended the retention and strengthening of the existing local government structure, including the traditional structures. The Commission recommended that traditional authorities, as a local authority created by statute, should be empowered and receive their rightful share of resources, thereby strengthening the role of traditional authorities and their leadership. The Commission also recommended that the traditional leaders should also become *ex officio* members of district councils in their respective districts.

In Botswana, tribal authorities and their leadership are an integral part of the democratically elected local governance, as one of the four pillars of local government. The other three pillars are district councils, district administration and land boards. These newly created structures have taken away the exclusive authority of traditional leaders for development and allocation of tribal land in their areas of jurisdiction. Initially, when the land boards were created, traditional leaders were chairmen of these boards. The traditional leaders were subsequently removed from land boards after some years. Thereafter, traditional leaders had constrained relationships with the land boards for some years, mainly because they had lost their exclusive prestigious authority over tribal land allocation. However, subsequently, traditional leaders became reconciled to the changed situation and agreed to become *ex officio* members of these bodies (Moshia, 2007). As a result, tribal authorities were retained and came to play a crucial and unique role in the establishment of local governance

Lesotho

In Lesotho traditional authorities have been the backbone of local governance during both the colonial and postcolonial era (Ray *et al*, 1997).

After independence restructuring, the Constitution and a number of items of legislation recognised traditional authorities and their leadership. The Constitution of Lesotho (1993) in section 103 provides official recognition of the traditional leaders. The legal status and functions of traditional leaders are further recognised and codified in three laws, namely the Laws of Lerotoli: the Chieftainship Act, 1968, Order No. 26 of 1970 and the Local Government Act (1997). The 1993 Constitution and the Chieftainship Act No. 22 of 1968 have reinforced the role of traditional authorities and leaders. These frameworks contain provisions for community councils to have two chiefs who are considered on a par with the elected councillors. Furthermore, traditional leaders were given many of the functions that civil authorities and local governments perform in other settings. After independence, for the most part, traditional authorities were retained albeit with adaptations, resulting in dualism at the local level in the rural areas.

However, in the legislation governing local governance, some powers of traditional authorities and leaders were transferred to the newly created democratic local governance structures, although, traditional authorities continue to play a critical role in local governance at the local level, especially in rural areas (Pratchett *et al*, 2008; Ray *et al*, 1997).

Traditional authorities and their leadership played an important role during the pre-colonial era, and have also continued to play an important role in the post-independence period, especially from 1966 onwards (Kapa, 2005; Mafuao, 2005). As a result, the system of traditional authorities and leadership is firmly entrenched and has been the main form of rural local governance in the country and continues to play an important role in local communities. In fact, during the period between 1966 and 1986 when local government was abolished by the military regime, only the traditional authorities and the village development councils were allowed to operate. Following the return to democracy after the 1986-1993 military dictatorship, local governance has undergone extensive reforms. Nonetheless, in terms of public consultations, the traditional authorities and their leadership are by far the institution closest to the people in the villages, where even elected councillors cannot exercise effective reach. Owing to their proximity to the people, traditional leaders are able to call *lipitso* (common assemblies) to consult with their people on several issues affecting their communities. The traditional authorities and leaders also perform a wide range of functions extending beyond those listed in the Chieftainship Act, 1968. In addition, they do not observe formal working hours as other public officials do, and people often call on traditional leaders even at night to resolve problems (Pratchett *et al*, 2008: 12). As a result, traditional authorities continue to perform several customary and development functions despite efforts to circumscribe their powers (Pratchett *et al*, 2008: 14). In short, the traditional authorities continue to operate alongside the new democratic local governances.

Although the legal and policy frameworks spelt out the roles of traditional authorities and the new democratic local authorities, the roles between the two institutions are not always clearly defined. Even where the traditional authorities and the new democratic local authorities are aware of the scope and nature of their respective mandates, the public in general do not seem to show the same kind of understanding. For most Basotho people, it is the traditional leader, not the elected councillor, who continues to be the main point of contact and a source of authority that they most closely relate to, even when the issue involved does not fall within the remit of a traditional authority (LNSG, 2008). As Pratchett *et al* (2008:16) aptly point out, most of the people "...have a rather foggy idea of the purpose of the newly set up local governments and do not identify with them".

South Africa

With the advent of the new democratic dispensation in April 1994, the new post-apartheid Constitution marked a new dawn for South Africa. One of the most critical issues at the centre of the restructuring and transformation process revolved around the role and status of traditional authorities and leaders. During the apartheid era many traditional authorities were associated with the apartheid regime, whose homeland policy relied quite heavily on traditional authorities for local governance (Mamdani, 1996). As in most countries in the region, traditional authorities and leaders had survived the changes of both the colonial and apartheid eras, and were now demanding to play a new role in South Africa's new democratic dispensation.

The Interim Constitution of 1993 recognised and protected traditional leadership, giving them *ex officio* membership of the new democratic local authorities. The 1996 Constitution also provides a significant level of protection, recognition and incorporation to traditional authorities and their leaders. In addition, the White Paper on Traditional Leadership, 2000 and the Council of Traditional Leaders Act No.10, 1997 prescribe that traditional leaders play a cooperative and support role in the local government system, as well as participate in the development of their communities in partnership with the new democratic local governance.

In addition, the following legislation has been passed to anchor the role and status of traditional leaders and authorities: the National House of Traditional Leaders Act (1997); the Municipal Structures Act (1998); the White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance (2003); the

Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act No 41 (2003); and, the Communal Land Rights Act (2004). With specific regard to local governance, Section 81 and subsections (1) to (4) of the Municipal Structures Act (1998) make provision for the consultation of traditional leaders in decision-making in those local authorities with jurisdiction over their area. The Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998) thus entrenched the role of traditional authorities in local development albeit the authority of the elected democratic local governance.

However, despite provisions in the Municipal Structures Amendment Act that allow traditional leaders to participate in council meetings as *ex officio* members, traditional authorities and leaders still feel threatened by the new democratic local governance structures, and have, on occasions, actively sought to exert their power. For instance, in October 2000, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESAs) forced the Mbeki government to postpone municipal elections and to convene a committee to address their grievance over the demarcation of municipalities and the resultant control of rural lands (Englebert, 2002).

Zimbabwe

Similarly, in Zimbabwe traditional authorities and leaders have formed the backbone of local governance both during the colonial and postcolonial era (Ray *et al*, 1997; Chakaipa, 2010; Makumbe, 2010). In the colonial era local governance was based on the native boards established in the 1920s and the native councils which succeeded them in 1927. They had both elected councillors and traditional leaders (Chakaipa, 2010: 44). Thus traditional authorities have been playing a key a role in rural local governance since before and after colonisation. At independence in 1980, traditional authorities were retained as a symbol of traditional values but were stripped of most of their administrative and judicial functions (DPLG, 2000: 8). Instead, the new democratically elected district councils assumed the functions that were previously performed by traditional authorities and leaders.

Both the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the Chiefs and Headmen Act (Chapter 29:01) provide for the recognition of the roles of traditional authorities and the elected democratic local governance. The recognition of the traditional authorities and leaders in the new political dispensation is predicated on the realisation that traditional authorities and leaders still play a significant role in the lives of the majority of the African people in the country. Since independence, a number of legislative and policy frameworks were introduced which sought to democratise and strengthen local government while at the same time recognising some roles and status of traditional authorities and leaders. The legislation and policy frameworks include the following: the District Councils Act of 1980 (amended in 1981 and 1982); the Communal Lands Acts of 1981 and 1982; the Customary and Primary Courts Act of 1981; the Prime Minister's Directive on Decentralization of 1984 and 1985; the Provincial Councils and Administration Act of 1985; the Rural District Councils Act of 1988; the Chiefs and Headmen Act of 1988; and the Customary Law and Courts Act of 1990.

Although the above legislation provides for the recognition of the role and status of traditional authorities, since 1980 their powers have been significantly reduced. However, as a consequence of their continued lobbying of the central government, the Chiefs and Headmen Act was repealed and the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 introduced. This Act gave traditional authorities and leaders wide-ranging powers to deal with problems of land and natural resources conservation and management; to preserve and maintain rural family life; and to punish crimes such as livestock theft and misuse of natural resources. Interestingly, the roles of traditional authorities under this Act are an exact re-enactment of the roles traditional authorities used to perform as rural local authorities during the colonial era. Under the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998, traditional authorities also became responsible for promoting and upholding cultural values,

overseeing the collection of taxes and levies for the rural district council, and ensuring that land and natural resources were used in accordance with national legislation.

Furthermore, with the emergence of the strong opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), in 1999 which posed a serious political challenge to the ruling ZANU-PF government in the rural constituencies, the political significance of traditional authorities increased significantly. The postcolonial regime has also sought to make use of traditional authorities to generate and sustain popular political support for the ruling party ZANU-PF. Consequently, in the charged political atmosphere, the traditional leaders have emerged in a powerful position, thereby making them very powerful political actors at the local level, and usurping the role of locally elected councillors who were now in a much weaker position. The powerful status of traditional leaders has exacerbated the rivalry, tensions, and conflicts with democratically elected councillors (Ncube, 2011). As Chakaipa (2010: 48) aptly observes: “Inevitably, conflicts arise with the elected leadership of local authorities on the control of turf”.

To sum up, in Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Zimbabwe, the Constitutions and a plethora of legislation recognise the institution, the status and the role of traditional authorities in the new democratic local governance. The legislation that has subsequently been enacted to anchor the role of traditional authorities and status of traditional leaders for the most part makes provision for their involvement in local authorities as *ex officio* members of councils at the district level (Kapa, 2005; Mijiga, 1998).

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

In order to anchor the role of traditional leaders, a network of development committees at the crucial local development front has been established, ranging from village assemblies, village and ward development committees, and leading up to the district development committees of district councils (Chikulo, 2010). In Botswana this has been facilitated through the *kgotla*, the institution that encourages and supports local level development, where consultations through popular participation in decision making and prioritisation of development are undertaken and passed through to village development committees and then onto to the district development committees (Sharma, 1997: 16). The *kgotla* and village development committees are under the direction of traditional leaders. In Lesotho, the development committee structure was created in terms of the Development Committees Order No. 9 of 1986 and the Development Councils Order of 1991 which created village development committees (VDC) under the chairmanship of the chief. There was also a ward development committee (WDC) of which the chief was an *ex officio* member. These committees reported to the district development committees on which traditional leaders sat as *ex-officio* members and chairperson. These committees were established to facilitate the development process in the country. Traditional leaders were made the chairpersons of these councils, which existed side by side with the land allocating committees established by the Land Act of 1979. These committees were eventually abolished by the Land Amendment Act of 1992, which transferred the power to allocate land from the land allocating committees to the village development committees.

In fact, district councils were suspended and then abolished by the Jonathan regime between 1966 and 1986, leaving only the traditional authority structures and the newly-created village development councils and ward development committees, created by the Local Government Act of 1969, as the main local governance structures. As Mafuoa (2005:4) points out, these structures “...served as forums for popular participation and execution of bottom-up planning and coordination of development activities”. The Local Government Amendment Act of 2004 significantly changed the status of traditional authorities and leaders in local governance.

In South Africa, at the sub-district level, the Municipal Systems Act 2000 obligates local government to establish ward committees on which traditional leaders sit as *ex officio* members to enable communities to participate in development activities. These committees are supposed to operate side by side with the traditional councils. However, for the most part, these committees have not been effective channels and as a result there is a lack of connectivity between communities and municipalities (Chikulo, 2010). Furthermore, according to the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (Act No.41 of 2003) section 5, the traditional authority should have partnerships with municipalities "...based on the principles of mutual respect and recognition of the status and roles of the respective parties". Traditional authorities feel that these structures have usurped their powers and are unhappy that ward boundaries cut across old traditional authorities (Van der Waldt *et al*, 2009: 16) In some cases, however, the functioning and relationship between ward committee councillors and traditional authorities depends on the working relationships of the personalities involved (Khanye, 2007: 320). As a result, there are areas where the elected councillors and traditional leaders have established a good working relationship.

In Zimbabwe, the Traditional Leaders Act 2000 now recognises the traditional authority represented by the village head (*sabhuku*) as the village development committee (VIDCO) chairperson. The village head is thus now the sole leader in all the cultural, judicial and developmental programmes at village level. These committees report to the ward development committee (WADCO), which ultimately reports to the rural district council. This arrangement seeks to integrate the traditional leaders into the local development (Ncube, 2011; Chaipa, 2010). As Ncube (2011) observes, it is characterised by the profusion of overlapping local organisational structures, each structure with its own boundaries, drawing on different sources of legitimacy, which created weak and disparate local institutions. However, despite the challenges faced by the network of development committees, they present the only potentially viable development front at the critical local level.

Furthermore, the incorporation of traditional leaders as *ex officio* members and chair- persons on the local development committees has allowed them to expand and entrench their roles and status in the development process at the local level. In fact, as some scholars have observed (Nxumalo & Whittal, 2013: 335) that "...poor levels of service delivery and development by municipalities highlight the need to recognise the role played by traditional leaders as they are often approached first by the community and have the ability to resolve disputes at local level without involving the formal courts". As a result, the challenge for local governance reform in the SADC region has been how to harmonise the structures of traditional authorities and leadership with those of the elected democratic local governance

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

Since the colonial period, local governance in the region as undergone significant restructuring and adaptations, yet traditional authorities and leaders have never been destroyed or replaced. Concerning the specific issue of the role and status of traditional authorities and leaders, local governance reform has been characterised by three trends: firstly, administrative and legal dualism due to the recognition of traditional authorities; secondly, efforts to weaken the traditional authorities through the creation of parallel local governance structures; and thirdly, attempts to integrate the traditional authorities and leaders into new democratic local governance structures, especially in the rural areas. The result, in most instances, has been the creation of parallel local governance structures. This 'dualism' in local governance resulted in competition between traditional authorities with first colonial and later on with postcolonial local governance instructions (Ekeh, 1979; Englebert, 2002).

Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Zimbabwe inherited the colonial local governance system predicated on traditional authorities, and have sought to harmonise them with the new democratic local governance dispensations. As Joubert *et al* (2008: 28) observed:

..... Worth noting in the Constitution, according to legal experts, is that it maintained the duality - traditionalism and modernism - of the system which implied dual legal system, dual functions and roles of the monarchy and dual legislative process.

By seeking to accept the status and role traditional authorities and integrate their functions into the democratic local governance system, the post-independent regimes have created a dual system of local governance in the rural areas. The end result is a system of hybrid local governance system of elected councillors, with traditional leaders still playing prominent roles within the new democratic local authorities. This system of local governance is akin to what Sklar (1999) calls the “mixed government”, whereby the post-independence regimes have kept the dual structures of local governance, albeit in a reconstructed manner. The challenge is that the resultant system of local governance is a hybrid based on traditional authorities and the new democratic local governance. Each of these has a different basis of legitimacy, with the traditional leadership legitimacy and authority being rooted in history and culture and, in the case of the new democratic local governance leadership, legitimacy of leadership is based on elections and is often embedded in constitutional and legal procedures and rules (Lutz & Linder, 2004; Eluder, 1998). Since chiefs are seen as the genuine representatives of the people, ordained by God to lead (Ntsebeza, 2001), most regimes in the region have made an effort to integrate them into the new democratic local governance or at least harmonised their structures into the structures of democratic local governance. As Heymans (2006) points out, this was done to avoid the tensions and contradictions between rational leaders and elected leaders at the local level.

In the rural areas where the state is weak, it had to fall back on the traditional authorities and leaders in order to deliver social services and implement its development strategies (Keulder, 1998). As Lutz and Linder (2004) have observed, in many cases it is very difficult or impossible to implement policies without the support of traditional leaders, especially in areas that touch upon the traditional customs of a community. It is mainly for this reason that the post-independence regimes had to retain traditional authorities and leadership. Lawson (2002) observes that the post-independence regime initially dismissed traditional leadership but later courted the traditional authorities and leaders after their popularity plummeted in later years in order to facilitate access to the rural populace.

The challenge posed by the tension between traditional authorities and the new democratic local governance remains pervasive in most SADC countries and negates the effectiveness of the new democratic decentralised local governance. The challenge is how to harmonise the two institutions so as to draw on the strengths of traditional authorities while reinforcing and legitimating new democratic local governance. In the post-independence efforts to reform and democratise local governance in the SADC region, the challenge encountered has been how to legally recognise and incorporate traditional authorities and leadership within the new democratic local governance dispensation,

CONCLUSION

This article reviewed the role and status of traditional authorities and leaders in local governance in SADC countries with a specific focus on Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Zimbabwe. In almost all these countries, the traditional authorities and their leadership were recognised as part and parcel of the local governance and retained after independence, albeit with diminished

powers. As a result, these countries have been characterised by dualism at local governance level, especially in the rural areas. This dualism, which Sklar (1999) called “mixed polity” and “mixed government,” has provided traditional authorities and their leadership some level of formal recognition and incorporation into the new democratic local governance structures. This recognition of traditional authorities and their leaders has given them a new dynamic as partners in local development and service delivery in the rural areas.

However, although significant progress has been made at attempts to reform local governance and establish the institutional structure and policy framework to harmonise traditional authorities and the new democratic local governance structures, key issues and challenges persist. The co-existence of traditional authorities with democratic local governance has, in some instances, created tensions and conflicts between traditional leadership and the elected councillors. The challenge posed by this tension between traditional authorities and local authorities remains pervasive in most SADC countries and negates effective delivery of services and development at the local level. The challenge facing the post-independence regimes in the region is how to draw on the strengths of traditional authorities while reinforcing and legitimising the new democratic local governance.

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SOCIAL CAPITAL – BOON OR BURDEN? AN EVALUATION OF FUNDING-RELIANT SOCIAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT IN AN HIV/AIDS-FOCUSED COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANISATION

R. Haines¹ & A. Shelver²

ABSTRACT

In 2012 UNAIDS estimated that 34 million people globally were living with HIV – a staggering statistic illustrating the scale of the epidemic. Mass coordination and response to the HIV/AIDS crisis acknowledge the need for multi-sectoral and integrated approaches. However, it is the very complexity in dealing with the crisis that has created some of the biggest hurdles to combatting the spread, impact and reach of HIV/AIDS (Jackson & Claeye, 2011). As globalisation accelerates, and with it greater international coordination, so complexity has matured (Preston, 1996; Stiglitz, 2001; Hailey, 2002; Cooper & Packard, 2005; Barnett & Whiteside, 2006). Research therefore needs to pull into focus the HIV/AIDS problem through an all-inclusive lens which charts its impact across everyday life, economy, society and politics, taking into consideration complex events, systems and outcomes (Colvin, 2005; Frohlich, 2005; Heyward, 2005; Whiteside, 2005). In the developing world and in South Africa, HIV/AIDS is compounded by multiple poverties (Colvin, 2005; Heyward, 2005; Ninan & Delion, 2009; Whiteside, 2002, 2005). Yet, despite this, a huge number of civil society and grassroots responses have emerged to combat poverty, disease and underdevelopment – and the combination thereof – collectively (Hyden, 2005; Mabaso, 2008; Kelly & Birdsall, 2008; Seckinelgin, 2008).

Charting the growth and impact of these organisations is critical in furthering developmental ends in developing countries, as civil society structures remain key nodes of influence (Barnett & Whiteside, 2006; Rau, 2006; Illife, 2006; Kelly & Birdsall, 2005; Kelly, 2011). The following article looks at the efforts of an Eastern Cape community-based organisation (CBO) to tap into the global governance structure of HIV/AIDS (Jackson, 2006; Jackson & Claeye, 2011) using social capital to execute a self-appointed mandate to deliver frontline health-care and support services. It analyses the challenges faced by the organisation, the limitations of entering the global structure and the impact of decisions to engage funders. It was found that although social capital is a useful emerging theory in health promotion (DiClement, Crosby & Kegler, 2002) and its expression has vast value in resource-poor locales, donors do not acknowledge its significance in total project delivery – particularly with regard to the impact short funding cycles have on fledgling social capital structures. It finds that both bridging and bonding social capital emerge through funding support in resource-poor locales, but that its lifespan and impact are tenuous if funding is not long-term. Notions of project success need to be altered from traditional, more qualitative views, to more holistic, societal outlooks – and social capital can be a useful lens for this analysis.

Keywords: Civil society; community-based organisation; development; global governance structure; social capital.

¹Professor R. Haines, Department of Development Studies, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa.

²Ms A. Shelver, Department of Development Studies, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa.

INTRODUCTION

The scourge of HIV/AIDS has borne many varied and interesting responses at global, country and local levels. The rapid spread and consequent monitoring, management and control of the disease have coincided with the equally fast-paced bounds of globalisation. The result of this is an increasingly co-ordinated response to the disease on a global level, further advanced by technological leaps, an increase in research and data generation, and the burgeoning of organisations primed to deal with the impacts of HIV/AIDS. Further resulting is a fusion of what was at first disparate organisations and governments working independently to mitigate the impacts of HIV/AIDS. This fusion was borne of the realisation that the HIV/AIDS crisis would have a mammoth impact on the grossly affected country's health sectors, socio-cultural frameworks, international development, and the global economy, prompting what can now be understood as a mass network of linked actors operating within a system of global governance of the virus and syndrome (Barnett & Whiteside, 2006; Jackson, 2007; Poku, 2002, 2006; Seckinelgin, 2005, 2008; Whiteside, 2002).

The following article follows a community-based organisation case study at the bottom rungs of the 'global governance structure' of HIV/AIDS and attempts to show how its co-option into this structure has resulted both in the growth of tenuous social capital in a fractured, poverty-stricken community, while concurrently, and ironically, jeopardising the evolution of social capital through inconsistent funding cycles.

Given nature of an intensely complex, multifaceted HIV/AIDS-focused global governance system, made up of supranational, international and national organisations, governments and non-governmental organisations, local-level community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are often "...brought in to localise global policies as free agents" (Seckinelgin, 2005: 357). The global system manifests itself at local sites which are, arguably, the only real place events happen (Estava & Prakash, 1997; Coetzee, 2001). Therefore these free agents, although perceived to be free, are actually the final implementation tool in a greater global system determined by the need to articulate itself at a tangible local level. However, its policies and interventions are constructed in global contexts often far removed from the reality of the locale it is intent on changing. These policies are also frequently universally applied and often do not take unique contextual variation into consideration. Application sometimes is therefore ill-suited to the context.

This article will also show that even when local responses become suitable through adjustment, the scope and diversity of adaption processes mean that CBOs are consistently changing to meet different donor needs for limited lifespan funding, causing organisational instability and destabilising the development of social capital. CBO sustainability hinges considerably on the availability of funding through the global governance system, in effect making CBOs dependent – a major challenge generally faced by many organisations within the system. Seckinelgin argues that local level CBOs and NGOs struggle to define their own terms of engagement, thus compromising their independence because of a greater system which requires them to "deflect or rearticulate" their particular aims under a global perspective which secures them funds to do the work (Seckinelgin, 2005). Moreover, they are unable to protect both their tangible and intangible deliverables against shock when the time comes, owing to a rooted dependency on a system that does not necessarily take cognisance of the unquantifiable outcomes of their work.

It is because of this that it was decided to approach the Masizakhe case study longitudinally to gain insight into the local level implementation and delivery dynamics to chart broader understandings of how the global influences the local. The following article looks at Masizakhe's efforts to tap into the global governance structure of HIV/AIDS (Jackson, 2006; Jackson & Claeys, 2011), using fragile social capital to execute a self-appointed mandate to

deliver frontline health-care and support services – and thereby grow community structures, and we argue, social capital, to mitigate the effects of the disease on society. It analyses the challenges faced by the organisation, the limitations of entering the global structure and the impact of decisions to engage funders. It finds that although social capital is a useful emerging theory in health promotion (DiClement, Crosby & Kegler, 2002) and its expression has vast value in resource-poor locales, donors do not acknowledge its significance in total project delivery, particularly with regard to the impact short funding cycles have on fledgling social capital structures. It finds that both bridging and bonding social capital emerge through funding support in resource poor locales, but that its lifespan and impact are tenuous if funding is not long-term. As a result notions of project success need to be altered from traditional, more qualitative views, to more holistic, societal outlooks – and social capital can be a useful lens for this analysis.

CBOs, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS

It is critical to find out what marks successes and failures of community-based HIV/AIDS responses so that these services can be improved and expanded to contribute to the positive development of health sectors and communities stricken by the disease. The HIV/AIDS crisis has significant development implications, especially for the workforce of South Africa and the Eastern Cape with its reliance on labour intensive manufacture and industry as an economic base (Illife, 2006; Poku, 2006; Kelly, 2011). Improved community organisations that are well placed and equipped to assist the formal health service structure in its multi-sectoral approach (DOH, 2007, 2011) to dealing with HIV/AIDS can contribute to the overall betterment of delivery and health of citizens (FHISER, 2006). Well-functioning CBOs can, and do, assist donors in the distribution of aid wealth throughout the massive international aid system that has evolved in response to the intersection of HIV/AIDS and poverty in communities (Jackson, 2007, 2011; Poku, 2006; Seckinelgin, 2005, 2008). However, currently there are deep formal integration challenges within the South African health system, as well as deeper issues in the health system in general; and NGOs and CBOs struggle with the power imbalance when it comes to their interactions with government departments, and the fear of being too critical of a government that often holds the purse strings (Hesjedal, 2011: 108).

There is a growing consensus about the relationship between HIV/AIDS, poverty and economic growth (Haacker, 2004). From a socio-economic perspective, the impact of disease, particularly HIV/AIDS, on development is far-reaching (Arbache, 2009; Piot, Bartos, Ghys, Walker & Schwartlander, 2007; Poku, 2006). The problem with HIV/AIDS is that it often strikes the workforce of countries, affecting not only those who can work productively to contribute to its economy but impacting its familial and social life, creating a cyclical impact on the economy (Illife, 2006; Poku, 2002, 2006; Whiteside, 2002). Poku (2006) argues that HIV/AIDS merges three processes along a course that is incredibly damaging to society and economy. First, it kills people in the prime of their working lives, thus destabilising both the economy and intergenerational socio-cultural capital formation; secondly, it compromises future development because of the inability of the succeeding generations to maintain development achievements of the past; and lastly, it erodes the growth of the vital human capital needed for development (Poku, 2006: 346). Piot, Greener and Russell (2007:5) also note that the economic impact of HIV/AIDS is proportionately greater for poor households. The result is further impoverishment and income inequality as per the cycle of poverty which concurrently impacts the GDPs of deeply affected countries (Piot *et al*, 2007). This is of particular concern given the increasing recognition that HIV/AIDS is a long-term phenomenon for which long-term strategies are required (Illife, 2006; Piot *et al*, 2007).

The global health governance system of HIV/AIDS has developed greater cognisance of the above-mentioned facts and hence the fundamental role attributed to civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), where real changes can be effected “on the ground” (Seckinelgin, 2006). This evolving system, which incorporates the non-profit and non-governmental sectors, came about after increasing disillusionment at third or poor world governments’ failure to meet donor objectives (Green & Matthais, 1997) and was framed by disenchantment with a persistent neoliberal agenda, structural adjustment plans and cutbacks on (government) spending and public funding as governments’ health sector focus moved towards markets and efficiency (Poku & Whiteside, 2002). International NGOs and civil society moved to fill the gap left by governments by routing funding through local organisations at the grassroots or community level and were well-placed for effecting change as new essential service providers (Buse & Walt, 1997; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Green & Matthais, 1997; Turshen, 1999).

As the HIV/AIDS problem grew in relevance over the years, it figured with greater prominence on the international political agenda. Seckinelgin (2008) argues that there were two waves in the internationalisation of the AIDS debate. The first framed HIV/AIDS as a disease that was a Western problem, predominant in the homosexual community and therefore somewhat side-lined and out of the ambit of major global intervention. At this point Africa did not play much of a role when it came to coordinating efforts or acknowledging HIV/AIDS as an important issue, as noted by the absence of any African country at the first International AIDS Conference in 1985 (Illife, 2006). As a result HIV/AIDS was initially articulated by outsiders rather than people living with it in Africa (Seckinelgin, 2008: 23). The second wave, in the 1990s, saw a shift in perception of the disease to one conceived through the gaze of medical science and international politics. At this stage, mass funding became available from international sources, creating local NGOs and supporting community initiatives (Seckinelgin, 2008). Essentially the focal point went to the epicentre of the disease, to the third world and particularly sub-Saharan Africa. The Global Fund in 2006 noted that 55 per cent of the \$4.4-billion provided by donor countries went to sub-Saharan Africa (Global Fund, 2006).


Historically, the HIV/AIDS response comprised a structure in which national governments were responsible for the health of their inhabitants and any cross-border engagement was done through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, while the World Health Organisation (WHO) took control of the cross-border effects of disease (Dodgson & Lee, 2002). The global governance structure evolved together with growing funds and availability of aid monies which effectively shaped and changed the nature of the merged global response (from local to global levels) in such a positive way that many inroads have been made into curbing and treating HIV/AIDS. Advancements are, however, under threat as aid shrinks back and major finance institutions, such as the Global Fund, freeze new grants (Bennett, 2011; Kardas-Nelson, 2011; Kelland, 2011).

In totality, the governance structure comprises international organisations such as the World Bank, and UNAIDS; individual donor countries, such as the US, UK, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands and their aid organisations (such as USAID, the Department for International Development [DfID]); national governments and their policy intervention channels; and national civil society (see Figure 1). At the local level, community groups and NGOs, both local and international, work with national or transnational NGOs (Seckinelgin, 2005). Looking at the global governance of HIV/AIDS, Seckinelgin (2005) contends that the role of civil society is to act as a channel between policy structures and the people. Often, it is those at the bottom of this massive structure, at the grassroots and local levels, who are at the lowermost end of the power spectrum and who find it most difficult to negotiate their real needs and desires and articulate the

impact of funding on delivery which is often skewed to quantifiable ends, and thereby influence policy.

The fundamental role that community responses play as a means to rolling out necessary services to those identified as needy is now relatively undisputed, despite the challenges they face. Currently, however, the need is for analysis of what exactly is happening within these organised community responses. The case of Masizakhe is important in that it tracks the organisation's efforts to tap into the global governance structure of HIV/AIDS (Jackson, 2006; Jackson & Claeys, 2011) using social capital to execute a self-appointed mandate to deliver frontline health care and support services.

Figure 1: The following diagram summarises the aforementioned levels of the global governance structure of HIV/AIDS and various interactions and relationships between different actions and levels in the development of policy formations, interpretation and implementation [Source: Jackson 2007].



SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY AS A LENS FOR ANALYSIS OF HIV/AIDS RESPONSES

Social capital is an emerging theory in health promotion (DiClement, Crosby & Kegler, 2002). Social capital, according to Putnam (1993), refers to features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. Putnam (1993) differentiates between two levels of social capital: bonding and bridging. Bonding social capital is present in homogenous groups which are bonded by trusting, reciprocally supportive relationships. Bridging social capital refers to the linking of different organisations

around a common purpose. Bridging social capital is important for the case of Masizakhe as it is particularly “...relevant in poor, marginalised communities where the resources within the community are not sufficient to tackle HIV” (Mathews, 2005: 153). Mathews (2005) notes that this level of social capital puts the focus on processes of accessing extra-community resources which do not undermine the participation and control of the community in question. Masizakhe’s entry into the global governance structure of HIV/AIDS resembles this form of social capital, which in turn has enabled it to grow other forms of social capital in its resource-poor locale.

When looking at the role of CBOs it is critical to look not only at the outputs they generate in terms of numbers and figures, but also deeper at the social capital they foster. There is an interesting tension that the context of HIV/AIDS creates with regard to social capital. On one hand HIV/AIDS and its deluge of negative impacts, in combination with poverty, has eroded societal safety nets and traditions that might have better mitigated the impacts of the disease, or possibly even curbed the spread of HIV/AIDS. On the other hand, organic civil society responses to HIV/AIDS have represented the growth or partial renewal of social capital and cohesion, although in a specific, limited way. Therefore the concept of social capital is a useful lens through which to analyse these civil society organisation (CSO) responses. In another twist of fate, social capital in these societies also hinges on the role international donors, government, NGOs and other contributors play. This reliance has caused another contradiction in that the growth of social capital within CBOs and the communities they assist is balanced on a tenuous economic base. The steady rise of available funds for HIV/AIDS responses (Seckinelgin, 2008: 31; UNAIDS, 2002: 167) has facilitated the growth of social capital by providing the necessary financial backing for programmes and stabilisation of projects through the availability of stipends. However, when this support is tenuous, intermittent and short-term, the fragile social capital and cohesion that are being constructed on the framework of aid support, easily collapse – further jeopardising fledgling projects and even those that are more established. The multiple poverties these communities face disallow them the ability to have self-sustainable bonding social capital for the foreseeable future and make them reliant on bridging social capital (Putnam *et al*, 1993). Inherent in this situation then is aid dependency, which this article argues donors, government and support structures should acknowledge and make provision for, if the commitment to combating the impacts of HIV/AIDS is dedicated.

Social capital has many definitions and is not an uncontested notion (Fine, 2002). It was used by sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1985), with other terms “cultural” and “symbolic capital”, to explain inequality; or “...how non-economic forms of domination are linked to the reproduction of social stratification and interact with one and another and the economic” (Fine, 2002: 20). Conversely, Putnam *et al* (1993) examine social capital in terms of the degree of civic involvement. This is aligned with the World Bank definition of social capital, which

...refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that holds them together (World Bank, 2010).

The World Bank definition shows the interrelation between social and economic forms of capital. Putnam *et al* (1993) used the notion of social capital to explain economic development variation between Italian regions and suggest that the forms of social capital exhibited in communities could explain their economic differences. In this case, high social capital equates to higher economic performance.

The South African example is interesting as shall be shown, as the country is perceived as wealthy, yet it has amongst the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the world. Barnett and Whiteside (2006: 131) show that despite its high wealth, South Africa has low social cohesion, a driving factor in the spread of HIV. While the notion of social capital is contested for varying reasons, it can be a useful tool to describe the activities of CBOs and people in communities in building trust, networks and effecting on-the-ground change. Bridging social capital also explains the process of drawing on networks outside the community to ensure survival and share risk. Social capital and social cohesion are connected. Social capital is the foundation of social cohesion (Barnett & Whiteside, 2002: 94). It refers to reciprocal ties and linkages between individuals, families and communities. Reciprocation is the key variable within interactions that create social capital (Barnett & Whiteside, 2002).

Barnett and Whiteside argue that "...social cohesion built on social capital reduces individual or small social group risk by spreading it among more people". In this case individuals find some cover for the future and can if need be "...mobilise resources in pursuit of joint goals to avoid or control risk" (2002: 94-95). This is key to understanding HIV/AIDS responses in South Africa. HIV causes an increase in "...social stress and claims on family, community and coping systems" while concurrently "...redistributing burdens to children and the elderly" (Fowler, 2004:7). Therefore, communities with higher levels of social capital are better placed to deal with HIV and its impacts. The term 'social capital' is thus used to explain why some communities are healthier, safer and more prosperous than others (Kelly & Van Donk, 2009).

When attempting to understand South African social capital formation in high HIV-risk communities it is important touch on the notion of *ubuntu* as an African philosophy of reciprocity, the impact of colonialism and apartheid and the role these played in both fracturing and forming social relations, as well as the impacts of poverty on social safety nets. The term *ubuntu* essentially means 'people are people through other people'. It is an African philosophy that embodies reciprocity and altruism. According to Hoza (2010), it is "...a philosophy that encourages communities to uphold the idea that your suffering/pain is my suffering/pain and your achievement is mine too and vice versa" (Mbiti, 1970). Essentially it is Gestaltic in that the needs of the group supersede the needs of the individual (Kwamwangamulu, 1999: 27). This, Le Roux (2000) confirms, results in social harmony and cohesion, starting at the family and cultural community, then spiralling out into the global community. Khoza defines *ubuntu* as an African value system that means humanness or being human, a worldview characterised by such values as caring, sharing, compassion, communalism, communocracy and related predispositions (2005: xi). It is easy to see the parallels between social capital and *ubuntu* given this definition. However, years of colonialism and for South Africa, 50 years of the race-based politics of apartheid eroded the foundations of *ubuntu* and communal living, essentially fracturing African social structures (Barnett & Whiteside, 2006; Hoza, 2010). The colonial experience and apartheid left particularly black South Africans in a weakened position in which they lacked social capital to cope with HIV/AIDS, exacerbating its spread.

At the same time, it could be argued that the responses and reactions to the apartheid regime actually built a kind of social capital based on activism (Hesjedal, 2011). In this way apartheid and colonialism can be seen to have both fractured and formed social relations and capital for certain groups of South Africans. Despite this tension, the overall impacts of apartheid – which included facilitating the impoverishment of millions and perhaps the spread of HIV/AIDS (Roberts, 1999) – have been to make poor South Africans more vulnerable to disease. Given this situation, social safety nets in South Africa have been found wanting. At the same time, however, community and civil society responses to HIV/AIDS are resulting in the fragile growth of a response-based social capital and cohesion in reaction to the multiple impacts of the disease. In

effect the impact of, and CSO response to HIV/AIDS mirrors the effect of and reactions to apartheid by civil society.

Loewenson (2007) and Barnett and Whiteside (2002, 2006) have both provided some interesting details about social capital, susceptibility to HIV/AIDS and risk mitigation. They suggest there is evidence that the social capital reserves within and social support from communities can and do make a difference to households and individuals affected by AIDS and the risk of HIV infection (Barnett *et al*, 2002; Decosas, 1998 in Loewenson, 2007). Under the generic term, social cohesion, a range of characteristics of communities have been described that are associated with lower susceptibility to HIV and vulnerability to AIDS. These include communities that have organisations, institutions and groups that recognise the threat of HIV and AIDS; that provide care and support; that have relationships of trust and respect between service personnel and community members; that are responsive to state authority and regulation; and have lower levels of income inequality (Barnett *et al*, 2002; Decosas, 1998, 2002 in Loewenson, 2007). Masizakhe is such an organisation, though it suffers from general aid dependency, particularly since it entered the global governance structure.

Social cohesion may, however, be undermined by HIV/AIDS (Kelly & Van Donk, 2009). HIV/AIDS increases household costs, creates instability, intensifies poverty, promotes stigma, generates vulnerability – especially for women and children – and endangers livelihoods, overall pushing community safety nets to their limits, undermining extended kinship ties and altering civic and cultural norms, including values linked to reciprocity and collective action (Kelly & Van Donk, 2009). It is therefore crucial to look at the slow growth of nascent structures in society to understand how social capital is being nurtured at the community level and what pressures hamper its sustained development. Pronyk (2002) has suggested strengthening social capital as a means of curbing the spread of the disease and reigning in its impacts. He proposes that social networks form an important part in this regard. They disseminate information, define and shape community norms and form a basis for multiple support systems (Pronyk, 2002). Thus there is both a horizontal sharing of the burden of poverty and disease. CBOs are thus incubators for social capital and also for bridging social capital in the networks they form and on which they draw.

In effect the social capital that active communities and CBOs contribute to poor areas is significant, even if it is only novice. It is organisations and groupings of this kind that are ultimately the backbone of further growth of social capital. Interestingly then, it could be argued that social capital has grown in South Africa as a result of HIV/AIDS. In large part, this growth has been supported by donors and government through a combination of both social and economic capital. It is important to note that the government multi-sectoral approach has resulted in the rapid growth of a range of lay workers who often hail from crisis-ridden communities (home-based carers and lay counsellors) principally in response to an expansion in budgets and programmes for HIV. This has in some regards assisted in building social capital through education, skills development and alleviating extreme poverty through the stipend system (Schneider, Hlope & Van Rensburg, 2008; EPWP, 2009).

While funding and budget for CSOs working in HIV/AIDS has increased, it is often not long-term or sustained. In poor communities, aid helps support the growth social capital but this initial capital is fragile, prone to fluctuations and can collapse easily if not supported long-term; meaning that aid needs to be committed and consistent. The irony is that social capital in this instance needs an economic base on which to truly expand.

So is social capital purely social capital or is it economic?

Although this article cannot answer this question conclusively, it would argue that for the Masizakhe case study, the poverty-stricken locale necessitates some form of long-term monetary input to facilitate the growth of social capital. If aid is not long-term and sustained, fragile social capital is easily lost, further entrenching poverty, and robbing already weak communities of opportunities and hope. The nurturing of social capital is thus a complex and slow process made more difficult by recessions and the short-term funding of projects (Buse & Walt, 1997; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Green & Matthias, 1997; Marais, 2004; Turshen, 1999).

There is also a “dark side” to social capital (Portes & Landholdt, 1996; Fine, 1999, 2002). Negative consequences include jealousy in communities over skills, perceived monetary gains and inevitable conflicts of interest – actors, Fine (2002) points out, social capital tends to ignore. There are also inherent power issues which need to be addressed when assessing social capital. Nevertheless, social capital offers a unique lens and tool for attaching real value to what CSOs are doing in the face of HIV (DiClemente, 2002). Hence one needs to consider whether organic responses to HIV/AIDS can actually be considered to be representative of social capital and cohesion; or whether it is simply just a community coping activity at play and not real evolving social capital. This article argues that what we are witnessing in South Africa, with the growth of responses to the disease, is social capital in its infancy. Therefore it remains critical to map the emergence of these responses and what their major challenges are so we can have a foundation on which to build a South African understanding of social capital in the face of disease and poverty. Neither can one ignore the fact that organisations that “...emphasise social support, empowerment, care and reduction of stigma and exclusion have helped to facilitate the inclusion of people with HIV/AIDS, have made a difference in the lives of their beneficiaries” and have on some levels “...promoted social solidarity in the face of the epidemic” (Kelly & Van Donk, 2009: 139).

CASE STUDY: MASIZAKHE COMMUNITY PROJECT

The Masizakhe (“together we build”) Community Project is situated in a former men’s hostel area in Kwazakele, Nelson Mandela Bay in South Africa. The employees and volunteers of the Masizakhe Community Project are members of a poverty-stricken urban township area who have experienced, at a personal and professional level, the impact of HIV/AIDS first-hand. Masizakhe delivers holistic HIV/AIDS care to the community in which it is situated. It is also the recipient of aid from a series of international, national and local donors, from governments to international NGOs and FBOs (faith-based organisations); multilateral and bilateral organisations to local community organisations.

Masizakhe is a non-profit organisation and belongs to the Eastern Cape NGO coalition. At the point of research (November 2010), it had no major donors funding it. However, over the previous nine years the organisation had been a beneficiary of donations and funding from the likes of iThemba AIDS Foundation (FBO), Starfish Greathearts Foundation (FBO), PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) (Bilateral), the UK Department for International Development (UK Government), the South African National Lottery Distribution Fund (SA), the Department of Health (SA), the Department of Social Development (SA), ABC Trust (NGO) and the Barnabas Trust (NGO), which have all assisted the continued survival of the CBO.

According to the chairperson of the project, Beatrice Mpati, the locale is one deeply affected by poverty, disempowerment, disillusionment and disease. Kwazakele was built in the 1950s and the area in which Masizakhe is situated has a turbulent history (Cherry, 2001). From the 1950s onwards, Cherry notes, Kwazakele developed slowly into a typical working-class residential area (2001: 69) where “...residents grew to know their neighbours and relationships of trust and

reciprocity were built”, developing, by the 1980s, into a “relatively cohesive community” (2001: 73) indicating an already present level of bonding social capital in the area.

Historically, Matthew Goniwe Village was a hostel area where male contract/migrant workers coming from rural areas and other towns and cities, and looking for work in Port Elizabeth (PE) were designated places to stay, making it the site of the only migrant labour hostel in PE (Cherry, 2001: 194). Later, however, families started to encroach on the area, pressurising for housing. The hostel area became a site of mobilisation around the need for family accommodation and a decent standard of living (Cherry, 2001: 194).

The Masizakhe Community Project arose in response to the needs of this community. In its first manifestation, in the early 1990s, it aimed to meet the needs of parents entering the job market but needing a safe place for their children during the day; hence the Masizakhe Pre-School. Later, when the community began feeling the impacts of HIV/AIDS as people became debilitatingly ill with a ‘mystery’ disease, Masizakhe moved to cater for them with the initiation of a home-based caring scheme. Finally when people living with AIDS (PLWA) died and children and grandparents were left to look after the household, Masizakhe launched an initiative to serve grandparents, orphans and struggling family units, which ultimately morphed into its Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) programme to assist with the needs of some of the weakest members of the community. Thus, Masizakhe has typically acted in response to the impact of HIV/AIDS on the surrounding community and moved to mitigate these consequences through the provision of essential services. As a result, in 2003, it eventually entered into the global health governance system via local and international donors, which in turn moved to support its work.

Masizakhe thus has a five-pronged approach to helping those in their area affected by and infected with HIV/AIDS. It functions as a pre-school, hosts a soup kitchen, is a base for a HBC programme and its volunteers, operates a support group for PLWHA and also runs an effective and comprehensive OVC programme.

For eight years the project was characterised by perennial success (Shelver, 2007). It managed to grow and was also looking, if funding allowed, at extending its reach to the neighbouring area of Greenfields, where a satellite for OVC would be opened. The growth of the project had been facilitated by its active campaigning for donors and networking, both within the community, with other CBOs, with government, local NGOs, FBOs, and with international donors. However, at the end of 2010, the project was looking dangerously as though it was about to shrink all the way back to its starting position, as donor aid had either dried up or retreated; and poor management decisions threatened to sink the project.

The Masizakhe case study was first analysed in 2007 and again in 2010 and 2011 to mark changes over time, in an effort to note its challenges and successes, the limitations of entering the global structure and the impact of decisions to engage funders. To do so, combinations of complementary research methodologies were employed to compare how the organisation had changed over time, identify what long-term challenges the CBO struggles with and why, and to assess how they create and manage success, such as the longitudinal approach qualitative and quantitative methods, participant-observation and document analysis. These general methodologies assisted in helping the research identify what long-term challenges endure at the organisation and the reasons for their persistence.

The outcomes showed that existing problems in this particular CBO are very difficult to overcome without committed, sustained support from donors, government, community and the organisation’s members. Masizakhe was hamstrung by a series of intersecting factors which hampered its ability to problem-solve and act. The major challenge for the organisation remained the inconsistent donor cycle and resultant instability thus created within an organisation already

working in a highly volatile, unstable situation marked by poverty and disease. The other emergent challenges were a battle internally with ‘founder syndrome’ (a difficulty faced by many organisations where one or more founders maintain disproportionate power and influence following the effective initial establishment of the project, leading to a wide range of problems for both the organisation and those involved in it), a lack of management transparency and a dysfunctional board.

But bar the governance challenges, the research focused on identifying what the organisation creates and why it is important in HIV stricken communities. Considering the role CBOs play, the impact they have on people’s lives, the networks they establish and maintain, the services and support they offer and the love and care they provide - essentially, the social capital they assist in building - is central to understanding how communities in developing countries are coping in a rapidly changing and challenging world. Also, these organisations do not work in isolation; they are interconnected with local, national, and international structures in a complex web of interaction. This matrix of interaction forms the skeleton of the “global governance structure of HIV/AIDS” (see Figure 1; Jackson, 2007; Seckinelgin, 2005, 2008).

It is critical to study the role of community organisations in this structure, as Loewenson (2003) suggests: “Civil society, whether through voluntary associations or non-state organisations, can perform many roles, supporting households, facilitating co-coordinated public action, satisfying shared necessities or interests and engaging with the state” (Loewenson, 2007: 4). Loewenson (2007) has called for more studies on what communities are doing about HIV/AIDS, about the state and non-state institutions they interact with and opportunities for and barriers to more supportive community environments. This type of research can map social capital and its impacts, fill knowledge gaps and potentially have the positive effect of assisting in communicating reasons for successes and failures throughout the governance structure in an effort to deal with the complexity locked therein.

The case study presented here was initiated with these considerations forming a backdrop for the research. In the current governance structure there is consensus that community responses form a critical part of a mechanism of service delivery aimed at meeting international development goals and mitigating the impact of HIV/AIDS, other diseases and poverty (FHISER, 2006; Ninan & Delion, 2009; Kelly & Van Donk, 2009). However, others argue the role allocated to these organisations is limited, limiting and fundamentally bound up with inherent power dynamics (Seckinelgin, 2005; Hyden, 2005). Seckinelgin (2005) believes that many community organisations are “...depoliticised as receivers of aid,” rather than activated as true participants in the architecture of aid. This system of depoliticisation, according to Hyden (2005), enforces hierarchies and hegemonies of power. Others argue that community organisations have simply become service providers at the bottom end of a chain of command, which carry out the work but without possessing influence on policies and practices set out by the (global) architects (Hesjedal, 2011; Kelly & Birdsall, 2008; Seckinelgin, 2005, 2008).

It is also common to find many community organisations, supported by external funding, regularly realigning their vision to the mercurial demands of the ever-changing aid organisations supporting them. This contradicts the common assumption that NGOs and CBOs are working in proximity to communities, responding to their needs and speaking on their behalf. Often the reality is that NGOs and CBOs are in “survivalist” mode and respond not to their communities, but to the changing aid climate (Hesjedal, 2011: 107-108; Kelly & Birdsall, 2005). The global aid industry itself, in totality, is fraught with contradictions, complexities and limitations most recently reflected in media reports on a global retreat of HIV/AIDS aid (Bennett, 2011; Kardas-Nelson, 2011; Kelland, 2010, 2011; Mabela, 2011; McElroy, 2011; SAPA, 2011).

In this case the Masizakhe Community Project has unravelled. But as it spirals, it is possible to say that this once shining example of a CBO is finally conforming to a generalised pattern of failed CBOs (Madeley, 1991). Unfortunately, sinking with it are its staff and tragically, its clients – small children, HIV-positive people, sick and dying AIDS patients, a community reliant on its services, orphans and vulnerable children. Once a thriving project that seemed as though its future was written on the wall as a leading example of true community development, Masizakhe is plummeting into dark depths of founder syndrome, foraging for finance, loss of focus and original goals, lack of management transparency, instability of staff, board oversights and disinterest, diversification into non-mandate areas and the subsequent struggle to keep the organisation afloat.

When we first arrived at Masizakhe in 2007, it was a project that was booming a CBO ‘amoeba’ full of the life-giving waters of donor aid. The situation is now completely the opposite.

The longitudinal analysis was able to point out some of the early Achilles’ heels of the organisation in 2007; but also how the greater governance system of HIV/AIDS has contributed to its failure and other external factors that have also played a role in Masizakhe’s demise. Two linked factors outside of the control of the organisation were the global recession and an overall pullback in donor aid (Bennett, 2010; Kardas-Nelson, 2011; Kelland, 2010, 2011). The ill-fated coincidence of all these elements has sent this once flourishing organisation into a tailspin that may see it close its doors. There is always optimism though, and the organisation has managed to secure vast amounts of social capital to assist it with its mission, a reserve which is still in supply. Also, given the organisation’s history of resilience which now spans almost 20 years, there may be method in the perceived madness of the project leader who has resisted the easy route to saving the project: using its fundraising money. Only time will tell and it may be interesting to revisit the Masizakhe Community Project to see in what form it might still exist.

Overall, however, it was the recent mercurial funding environment that played a significant role in the demise of the organisation. The tragedy therein is the failure of donors – government, NGOs, INGOs, bilateral and multilateral organisations – to support the growth of fledgling social capital through CBOs over the long-term. South Africa provides an interesting context for this with its long history of colonialism and later apartheid which fragmented and damaged indigenous South African people’s inherent social capital and cohesion (Illife, 2006; Barnett & Whiteside, 2006; Kelly & Van Donk, 2009).

Yet, conversely the response, first to the political situation during apartheid and later to the impacts of HIV/AIDS, can represent on some levels the revival of a form of social capital. The growth of this most recent form of social capital has been buoyed by donor funds. When, however, these funds are short-term, intermittent, delayed or tied to complicated terms and conditions, the fragile social capital that is being fostered is subjected to the fluctuations of funding and is therefore neither consistent nor sustained. Marais (2004) and others (Illife, 2006; Barnett & Whiteside, 2002; Kelly & Birdsall, 2008) note that HIV/AIDS is a long-term disease requiring long-term commitment. The current donor-funding environment does not, and in some instances like recession, cannot support the long-term approach. Sustained support of successful community-based projects is crucial both as an overall response to the HIV/AIDS crisis and a means to facilitating the development of social capital in poor communities. However, it is important to note that not only CBOs suffer in restrictive funding or economic climates. Larger NGOs and INGOs also feel the ripple effect of limited funds across the HIV/AIDS global governance structure. An example is the impact of PEPFAR funding cuts, not only on Masizakhe but also on its donor, Starfish, a PEPFAR granting agency.

The longitudinal analysis of Masizakhe Community Project has revealed the importance of long-term funding in building social capital. It has also shown how the retreat of donors or short-term

donor contracts jeopardise the sustainability of organisations and in consequence, the development of social capital in poor communities. It has also presented the long-term challenges faced by the CBO on which the research focuses.

As donor aid started its retreat, contracts were not renewed, overall budgets were cut and the Masizakhe ‘amoeba’ started to wither and ultimately the programmes contracted with it. Unfortunately, the result was that critical holistic service delivery was diminished or even halted in the process, severely impacting on the weakest community members. Masizakhe’s engagement with the community was fracturing and delicate structures were disintegrating in the face of such challenges which, in turn, put pressure on community linkages and service delivery capabilities. It also pressurised bridging and bonding capital as Masizakhe could neither deliver on its promises of holistic care service delivery to its community nor effectively lobby its networks for support.

Interestingly, Masizakhe had been able to reach its pinnacle because of the long-term commitment of its most influential donor, iThemba AIDS Foundation. Since its exit in January 2010, Masizakhe has been floundering.

Six main challenges were identified in 2007: organisational instability due to short-term nature of donor contracts; unquestioning acceptance of any type of aid as the organisation was not in a position to negotiate its demands; the homogenising impact of the HIV/AIDS governance structure on organisational systems which hampered the development of organic, African management systems; a dependency on the project leader for high-level organisational operations; the fact that men did not play a significant role in the organisation, skewing Masizakhe towards becoming a woman’s community organisation and thus not a true *community*-based organisation; and lastly, government bureaucracy and long waiting periods for funding played a role in stunting the growth of the organisation.

In 2010, most of these challenges remained, although in either advanced or altered forms. Instability due to short-term donor contracts was still present, coupled with dependency on its long-term donor. Also, the late and reduced payment of the DOSD funding meant the organisation was further destabilised. Many of the subsequent challenges that subsequently arose were related to Masizakhe’s mercurial funding environment. The unquestioning acceptance of aid had morphed, given the limited number of active donors, from accepting any form of aid to foraging for finance and the inability to hold donors accountable for lack of or late payment. This desperate situation in turn led the organisation to start dabbling and diversifying in non-mandate areas, causing a slight loss of organisational focus. Homogenisation of skills, training and reporting to conform to the standards of the global governance structure remained a doubled-edged sword for the organisation as possession of these skills enabled it to access donors and funds, but also limited the development of unique management routes, and possibly of greater engagement with local stakeholders. Reliance on the project leader continued to be a great challenge for the organisation, particularly as she enforced her leadership role, not as she had in 2007 in an autocratic stance towards donors, but over her staff as she lost control over the donor situation. The project leader started to display symptoms of founder’s syndrome as 2010 progressed and as the organisation’s financial situation worsened.

For Masizakhe, 2010 was characterised by a steady decline of funds due to waning donor support. Overall, this funding deficiency caused the shrinkage of programmes; loss of human resources; inability to upgrade training; hampering of holistic care service delivery; and inability to implement its organisational long-term vision. It also then meant that community trust in the organisation was shaken. New and latent challenges also arose or came to the fore in 2010. The first of these, staff turnover, is a characteristic challenge for all CBOs. The second challenge was the stipend system, which both compromised the spirit of volunteerism and promoted a culture of

expectation within the organisation. Thus, when the organisation could not pay stipends, staff resigned. These two challenges are consequently interlinked. In general also, the site and space continued to be a problem; as did a lack of infrastructure and resources.

Masizakhe has engaged the HIV/AIDS global governance structure for the past eight years. In that time it established relationships with multi-lateral and bilateral actors, INGOs and NGOs, government structures and other CBOs, while also establishing its own independent networks of support. Its interaction saw its role morph from an organic response to the HIV/AIDS crisis, to one that is synchronised with the global response. In the process, it has become an implementing agent of both global policies and local policies. Now, with moves by multilateral agencies to coordinate and harmonise with national government's policies (PEPFAR, 2010), Masizakhe has become a local agent of a greater streamlined international response to the disease. There are a number of impacts on the organisation as a result of its engagement with the global governance structure. Most notably of these is the fact that it now cannot survive without support from the structure. This dependency has possibly led it into a misguided reliance on the actors within the structure and diverted its attention away from seeking other (more local) support avenues. However, in the given South African environment marked by poverty, CBOs have fewer local support options on which to rely. Therefore, the state and international aid systems provide more viable options for funding and support. Given the complexity of the system, they are compelled to simplify and homogenise the smooth operation of the HIV/AIDS global governance system, which then impacts the local level, where particularities of the specific locale served are overlooked. Because of its relative efficiency, the system also creates dependency of beneficiaries on it. At the same time, it depends on the local level actors to turn policy into praxis; therefore a co-dependency between donors and beneficiaries exists. Acknowledgement by donors of this co-dependent relationship might lead to long-term commitments to facilitate long-term coping mechanisms for dealing with HIV/AIDS.

Then, there is the link between donor aid and social capital. Whether or not it is the intent of the actors and donors within the governance structure to create and build social capital in poor communities, its development is one of the consequences of donor support of CBOs. In communities that are resource poor, the influx of resources in the form of funding, infrastructure, support systems, and skills and education can catalyse the growth of social capital. Support alleviates the immediate need for personal survival and facilitates routes for the development of methods that promote group survival, the sharing of risk and the building of relationships of reciprocity. Bonding social capital is enabled through greater engagement with the community, increased feelings of belonging (particularly for PLWHA and their families), empowerment through knowledge and skills, and avenues of support facilitation. Masizakhe achieves this, both within the organisation and in the community, through its programmes. Bridging social capital is enabled through the linking of Masizakhe with different organisations around the common goal to mitigate the impacts of HIV/AIDS. Bridging social capital has therefore grown through the multi-tiered network Masizakhe constructed to aid it in its mission. In this way Masizakhe assisted its community to access extra-community resources, which then assisted both the organisation and the community.

However, it is clear that social capital in the case of Masizakhe is capriciously hinged on the availability of committed donor funding. The longitudinal analysis of the Masizakhe Community Project revealed the importance of long-term funding in building social capital. The long-term involvement of iThemba is a prime example. It managed to facilitate the growth of the organisation and its reach into the community and also increased employee capacity. Its long-term approach aided the growth of organisational and community social capital, firmly illustrated by the community's acceptance and utilisation of Masizakhe. Masizakhe would not have been

able to expand without community support and the organisation has impacted massively on the lives of people in the Matthew Goniwe Village area. iThemba's relationship with Masizakhe showed what could be achieved with long-term funding but also illustrated the negative impacts of long-term donor dependency. Both Loewenson (2007) and Barnett and Whiteside (2002, 2006) suggest there is evidence that the social capital reserves within and social support from communities – in this case reserves accumulated by Masizakhe – can and do make a difference to households and individuals affected by AIDS and the risk of HIV infection (Barnett *et al*, 2002; Decosas, 1998 in Loewenson, 2007). CBOs do facilitate the growth of a community's social capital, albeit growth supported by donor aid, when it is in supply. CBOs need funding (monetary capital) to build social capital and without funding, social capital remains fragile and can crumble when funding falls away. Donors – government, NGOs, INGOs, bilateral and multilateral organisations – therefore need to acknowledge this impact and support the growth of fledgling social capital through CBOs over the long term to create a meeting of minds, not a minefield of shattered social capital and unrecognised potential.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this research was to obtain a real grasp of what was happening at the local level of HIV/AIDS care service delivery so long-term strategies for dealing with the long-term nature of the HIV/AIDS crisis could be highlighted. In this regard, it was found that long-term funding of successful CBOs should be encouraged as a means to mitigating the impact of HIV/AIDS through the support of social capital growth.

The HIV/AIDS governance structure, with its focus on short-term contracts and its occasional inability to stick to timeframes and agreements, essentially created destabilisation for a Port Elizabeth CBO operating in an already volatile context. This created a persistent feeling of instability at Masizakhe and caused the organisation to operate in an environment of perpetual crisis management, both before 2007 and during 2010, the two research periods (Akintola, 2004; Marais, 2007). There was a fleeting period of aid abundance between 2007 and 2009, but was short-lived. In 2007 aid stability was already a concern together with concerns over buy-in to and dependency on the HIV/AIDS governance structure and its impact on organisational instability – a concern justified in 2010/11 when the organisation shrunk down to a barely operational state, owing to a number of reasons, one of which hinged on reliance on aid structures. However, the very nature of the HIV/AIDS global governance and its structure is geared for and operates within deep complexity through the tools of homogeneity and simplification, and cannot entirely be blamed for challenges that were concurrently emerging within the organisation.

Despite this, Masizakhe had made a serious and tangible impact on the community and, it is argued, managed to build fledgling social capital in the face of major challenges, compounded by poverty and disease. As a result, the research attempted to map the social capital that evolved out of the Masizakhe's work. One of the key impacts of donor engagement with Masizakhe was the development of social capital. Masizakhe's entry into the global governance structure of HIV/AIDS resembles a form of bridging social capital, which, in turn, has enabled it to grow bonding social capital within its community. However, there was little acknowledgement by donors of this outcome, bar its one long-term donor, iThemba, and to a limited extent, Starfish, which committed to the organisation long enough for it to expand its reach and make a significant impact on both the staff and the community. In order for the notion of organisational success to be extended past capacity and to acknowledge the life-changing work that is being done, social capital needs to be embraced as a useful lens for analysis and a tool for real community development. Regardless of the fact that the Masizakhe case showed that the evolution of social capital was attached to an economic base – in this case, donor aid – this does not discount the evolution of social capital. Rather, it enforces the idea that sustained, long-term

support of successful CBOs can promote the necessary skills and social capital needed to assist resource poor communities in coping with both poverty and disease.

The research has also shown a tension between social capital and aid where benefits are juxtaposed in both a positive and negative manner. Social capital that develops based on aid support is a boon for the community in that it provides them with the ability to deal with challenges and assists in developing support structures. Similarly, for aid agents it is a boon in that communities rich in social capital communities are better equipped to deliver services funded by aid. However, social capital is fragile and unstable. It is hard to maintain its growth without the availability of funding and therefore its development and growth is precarious. There is also a dark side, marked by jealousies and coveting of available funds. For aid organisations, acknowledging the importance of social capital becomes a burden in that it means restructuring its approach to delivering aid.

At the global level there needs to be greater cognisance of the impact of global interventions at the local level. There are both positive and negative impacts of aid intervention. One of the positive impacts is the growth and support of social capital structures in poor communities through sustained donor aid. Donors need to be cognisant of what is created and what the total consequences of their engagements are when they fund CBOs; and also what they depart with when they exit. Therefore, long-term strategies are key for both mitigating the impact of HIV/AIDS and for providing communities with tools with which to deal with the crisis – a major consideration for all participants in the global HIV/AIDS response, whether boon or burden.

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SCOPES AND DEFICITS OF PARTICIPATORY GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS (PGIS) IN MUNICIPALITIES IN THE CENTRAL KAROO

A. Haubold¹

ABSTRACT

The practice of participatory geographic information systems (PGIS) is investigated as an instrument to support public decision-making in the case of shale gas mining development in the central Karoo, South Africa. Shale gas mining development affects citizen rights and environmental justice. It is a problem encountered not only in South Africa, but also and especially in the USA, Canada, Germany, Poland and in other countries. Final decisions are made at national level, but the possible negative implications are experienced and born locally. The aim of this research is finding applications of geospatial technologies which lead to (local) community empowerment, participatory decision-making, good governance and in highlighting ways to implement participatory approaches in the management of environmental resources. The findings are based on an empirical study conducted in January 2012 in the study area, consisting of expert interviews and spatial data collection. The use of PGIS is strongly recommended for several reasons which are presented in this article.

Keywords: Participatory geographic information systems; shale gas mining development; Karoo; SWOT analysis.

INTRODUCTION

The promise of natural gas to be a ‘game-changer’ in energy-related questions has stimulated interest in central South African (particularly in the Karoo) fossil resources, with the political leadership engaging in shale gas development. The moratorium issued by the National Department of Mineral Resources on application requests by energy firms such as Shell to explore economically viable gas reserves was lifted in September 2012. Public debate is gaining momentum concerning the effects of *fracking*.

Scientists disagree about the implications of natural gas development as an energy source to provide economic, environmental and political benefits. Environmental challenges are regarded as the decisive issue of natural gas development. These include groundwater disturbance; water contamination and the treatment thereof; the increasing likelihood of earthquakes; the (erratic) leakage of gas into the atmosphere; air and noise pollution; ecosystem disturbances; soil sealing; and many secondary implications (Broderick, Anderson, Wood, Gilbert, Sharmina, Footitt, Glynn, & Nicholls, 2011; Entrekin, Evans-White, Johnson, & Hagenbuch, 2011; Rumbach, 2011; Simon & Fleming, 2011; De Wit, 2011). The impacts on human and animal health have been examined by Bamberger and Oswald (2012) whose findings indicate that certain aspects of the drilling process may lead to health problems.

These and other arguments are used by environmental groups, activists and private individuals to oppose fracking in many countries. Supporters of shale gas development point out the economic benefits and geopolitical reasons for producing energy from natural gas. It seems as though the

¹Ms A. Haubold, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa.

South African government is following the latter line of argument. Eventually, economic interests might supersede environmental concerns. Powerful interests steer the different perspectives on environmental issues and management.

This is where the implementation of participatory approaches, such as participatory geographic information systems (PGIS) is emerging. Geographic information systems (GISs) are being defined as “a[...] tool which one can use for exploring and analysing data that are recorded for specific locations in geographical space” (Wilson & Fotheringham, 2008: 1). With the help of GIS, it is possible to generate new data and information by the spatial analysis of existing data. GIS, or geospatial technologies, are applied e.g. in spatial planning or natural resource management.

PGIS is “...an emergent practice in its own right” (Rambaldi, Kyem, McCall, & Weiner, 2006) that has its roots in participatory approaches to planning, spatial information and communication management (Rambaldi & Weiner, 2004). The aim of PGIS research is to find applications of geospatial technologies which lead to community empowerment and good governance (McCall, 2003).

The applications of PGIS range from GIS to participatory 3D-modelling and mapping exercises (Carver, 2003). These provide opportunities for laypersons to learn how to make use of geospatial technologies and reap their benefits. The latest activities can be tracked on diverse websites, such as IAPAD (2012), ppgis.net (2012), and FracTracker (2012) as a specific application in shale gas mining development.

Participatory GIS make use of local knowledge (Harris & Weiner, 1998; McCall, 2003; Elwood, 2006). This has been roundly dismissed in the public participation process offered by energy companies such as Shell (Havemann, Glazewski & Brownlie, 2011). Even in the participatory processes at municipal level, in the course of Integrated Development Planning, local knowledge is used minimally and the possibility of the inclusion of citizens in decision-making is closed in many instances (Weiner *et al.*, 1995; Todes, Karam, Klug & Malaza, 2010).

In order to study the scopes and deficits of participatory GIS in the central Karoo, it is necessary and helpful to frame research questions which structure and guide the study. These are the following, as depicted in Table 1:

Table 1: Research questions guiding this study

Q1	What kinds of GIS applications exist? What kinds of data-sets are there? What is required (especially for the case study)?
Q2	How are existing GIS sources used? Who makes use of GIS and for what purposes (e. g. spatial planning)?
Q3	How could the public contribute to PGIS? What kinds of datasets would be required (especially for the case study)?
Q3	What kinds of (participatory) data sources exist, and how can public participation meaningfully add to this information resource?

The underlying assumption is: GIS can be used as a tool to guide development and spatial planning. The case of shale gas mining can be used as an example to test PGIS applications and this can be regarded as an attempt to make GIS more relevant and accessible to decision-makers at all levels, including local communities. The normative framework, thus, is to broaden public participation in GIS for the sake of public decision-making.

METHODS

The methodology described here framed studying the use of GIS in provincial departments and in some municipalities. Insights could be gained into the institutional arrangements of data sharing and production. Moreover, the guideline-based interviews helped to focus on the participatory approach chosen by Shell/Golder in order to include the public in the shale gas mining exploration application. This information was required to examine the options of participatory GIS in the future.

In the first phase of data collection, interviews were conducted with experts who are associated with different spheres of *provincial* government and administration. They constitute a group of professional GIS users and non-users. In the second phase of the data capture, *local* experts (such as farmers and entrepreneurs) were asked for their personal views on fracking and their potential ideas to contribute to participatory GIS.

An appropriate tool to extract information from the interviews with the experts is the use of *guideline-based interview types*. The guideline helps to structure the conversation according to topics. This enables the interview partner to elaborate on his/her experience and to put it in context, thus illustrating his/her knowledge with examples.

Interviews with provincial experts

Depending on individuals' specific profession, the interviews were aimed at those working in departments and scientific institutions. The interviews mirror particular aspects of institutional co-operation and the code of conduct related to the use of spatial data and information. The experts are not named here for reasons of privacy and data sensitivity. Instead, they are referred to as Interviewee A1-A10, and B1-B20.

Six (group and individual) interviews were conducted (10-23 January 2012) using a set of questions which were prepared prior to the meeting. Interviews were not standardised and questions were modified according to the experts' professional backgrounds and institutional positions. The interviews essentially consisted of two central topics: GIS, and fracking. In general, the questions posed sought information on existing geographic information (systems) on provincial level. The interviewees also functioned as mediators to other sources of information.

Interviews with local experts

The second phase of conducting interviews with experts included travelling to towns in the case study area (See Figure 1) which were selected according to the availability and expertise of the interview partners. Questions were asked which would help establish the knowledge and opinions of the interviewees. These persons had differing professional backgrounds, ranging from farmers, artists and entrepreneurs to scientists and officials working for National Parks.

Figure 1: Map of interview locations and Shell’s gas exploration area (black outline) which represents the case study (<http://goo.gl/maps/y5sPR>)



The interviews were not standardised and questions were modified to suit the particular situation of the discussion partners. Consequently, not all questions were posed in the same order, manner, and sequence. Some interviews had to be conducted in the field during the daily routine of the interviewees. Therefore, not all situations allowed for voice recordings. In this case, precise documentation of the collected data relied on memory minutes of the author. The interviews again followed a guideline-based approach.

INTERVIEW FINDINGS

This section provides information about the general availability and use of spatial information in the first part (i), and in the second part (ii) about information gaps, with particular reference to shale gas mining.

Provincial stakeholders: What GISs exist in the provinces?

It became apparent that different competencies among government departments influence the access and availability to geodata in general. Every department is in charge of its own datasets which are available to other departments with limitations, especially when associated with privacy or confidentiality matters. Sources of spatial data mentioned frequently were the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI), the National Department of Water (DWA), and the Centre of National Geospatial Information (NGI). These institutions provide a wide array of geospatial data and information to the public and to governments on different levels.

Data sharing is, however, not very common (Interviewee No. A1). The interviewed experts frequently made reference to the Council of Geosciences, but noted that it was important to be connected to “the right people” (Interviewee No. A4). The reasons for this are monetary assets and public security. For example, the partly privatised electricity producer, Eskom, does not release information about its network because of the possible manipulation of its power grid. Regularly updated information is also difficult to access. One respondent stated that participatory

or so-called crowdsourcing (Goodchild & Glennon, 2010; Sui, Elwood & Goodchild, 2012) approaches to data collection and management could help to solve this problem.

Yet, there are some provincial initiatives tackling the problem of data availability and access. The Spatial Planning and Information System (SPISYS) project is conducted in co-operation with two provincial governments and the National Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. Its main goal is to “sort out” inventories of spatial data and to use a common data structure on different levels of government (Interviewee No. A10). SPISYS is based on a web server infrastructure: all data will be stored centrally, but managed and organised by the data custodians who are the owners of the data and give permission for use. According to interviewee A10, the great advantage of this system is that real time changes are possible and regularly updated information can be retrieved by those holding access rights. The data users are grouped into public and expert user groups, implying that they have different access. The confidence levels of certain data have to be defined by the data producers, e.g. municipalities.

Another initiative is the Introducing GIS project sponsored by the Eastern Cape Government’s Chief Directorate: Spatial Planning & Information, Department of Land Affairs (Dassau & Sutton, 2009).

Local experts’ views

It appeared that most of the interviewees had a sound understanding of fracking-related questions, which can be partly explained by the fact that they come from educated and relatively affluent socio-economic backgrounds. These persons share a common vision to conserve their surrounds as they are; also, because it is an important economic asset for their livelihoods. It is necessary to understand that these points require further clarification in the future. They could be potential starting points in introducing participatory GIS within particular social groups.

Of greatest concern to the interviewees was the issue of water. First and foremost, farmers expressed their alarm over its local and regional scarcity and suspect that the fragile system will collapse in the case of shale gas development. Even though some interviewees stated that many agricultural practices are threatening water quality and quantity, all agreed that mining activities would exacerbate the problem. Another issue raised by interviewees was the treatment of wastewater. It is unclear where wastewater will be treated and how it will be transported. The transportation question also applies to the water which will be used in the process itself.

All interviewees called for greater transparency and exact information about risks and uncertainties in order to be prepared for potential water system disturbances. One respondent, however, assumed that proof of pollution is hard to assess because of agreements of disclosure by affected individuals.

Health problems have been named as a potential result of water contamination and industrial accidents (such as leakages and unintended fissures in boreholes). The interviewees doubt accordingly that the technology used will be entirely safe. Trust in energy companies is further reduced by internationally known accidents, or Shell’s environmental record (especially in Nigeria), which was explicitly mentioned during several interviews. A trenchant metaphor was used by one discussion partner who referred to employing “smoke and mirrors” to conceal the negative impacts of shale gas mining (Interviewee No. B1).

Figure 2: Typical Karoo landscape. Digital photograph by Sascha Klemm, Beaufort West



The unspoilt state and vastness of the Karoo landscape (See Figure 2) are values of the region ranking high in the list of its assets for tourism, thus indicating a dependence on the status quo. Even though, in many cases, tourism is not the only source of income, the sector plays a significant role in the Karoo economy. Many interviewees insisted that a visual impact analysis be conducted to establish acceptable distances between protected areas and potential mining areas (Interviewee No. B4).

As stated by interviewees, the fracking debate revolves around emotional ideas of what the Karoo landscape should, or rather should not be like. All interview experts agreed on this: shale gas mining would have major impacts on the sense of place of the Karoo. Regular references were made to the scale and intensity of mining activities in the USA. It was stated that owing to the relatively dull topography, with few exceptions it would be visually highly impacting.

The problem of the legislative context was mentioned by the interviewed local experts, but not dealt with in depth. Nevertheless, a few comments were passed about the developmental opportunities that large-scale shale gas mining would have. The financial surplus generated by it would leave the government in a state of “no choice”, as one respondent said (Interviewee B1). According to another respondent, Shell SA and the ANC are financially intertwined via the state-owned enterprise PetroSA and the Thebe Investment Corporation, a fact which makes the situation for the SA government very precarious (Interviewee B4).

Transparency in the exploration application process was part of the critique in every conversation. Neither of the interviewees had received personal notification about the project. One interviewee reviewed Shell’s strategy as a kind of “delaying tactic”: one that extends over such a long period of time that it falls into desuetude and is superseded by other more pressing issues (Interviewee B4).

The public participation process conducted by a consultation services provider, Golder Associates in some instances offended the Interested and Affected Parties participating in the meetings. Examples of these offensive activities were the use of “half-truths and lies” to convince uninformed parties to support shale gas mining in the Karoo (Interviewee B5). “They were caught lying, and they neglected any pollution or accidents”, said a farmer who has visited

the well sites in the Marcellus Shale region (USA) to get an idea of what kind of impacts shale gas mining has had there (Interviewee B5). Trust in the political leadership is deficient in general. Most of the conversations included comments about corruption, bribery, and political myopia. Typically reproved were the mismanagement of departments, work ethics, and patronage.

“Employment effects will be minimal” – this statement by one of the respondents indicates that the promise of large-scale job creation meets with some disbelief among the local experts (Interviewee No. B1). Interviewees were convinced that the installation of well pads and transportation will create jobs, but not as many as they can potentially destroy.

DISCUSSION: SCOPES AND DEFICITS OF PGIS IN THE STUDY AREA

The investigation of the potential of PGIS will be summarised with the help of a SWOT analysis (Dyson, 2004). This part connects findings from the interviews with the preconceptions of participatory GIS and underlying issues.

With reference to the present matter, the (SWOT) analysis consists of the internal strengths and weaknesses (Ss and Ws) of the PGIS approach, which need close investigation during the implementation of PGIS. This part of the analysis supplies a catalogue of the characteristics of PGIS and will highlight the differences between a PGIS scenario and a situation without PGIS initiatives. The described SWOTs are not intended to be exhaustive.

The external analysis consists of an evaluation of the PGIS'S external opportunities and threats (Os and Ts), which cannot be influenced prior to the implementation of the concept. The analysis, therefore, includes that of the status quo of participatory governance in the study area. Owing to the limitations of the length of this article, the author had to reduce the written analysis to the most important aspects.

INTERNAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF PGIS IN THE CASE STUDY AREA

Strengths

Inclusion of local knowledge

The inclusion of local knowledge is crucial to PGIS (McCall, 2003; Kyem, 2004). In the case study, it would mean asking local communities to identify the spaces of least/greatest environmental, social, economic and cultural concern which would be suitable for mining development. The frequently mentioned sense of place and the aesthetic value of the land especially could be mapped and displayed with respective symbologies (cf. Jung & Elwood, 2010).

Accelerated data production

Participatory GIS can further contribute to faster data production and in some cases ground-truthing of the existing spatial data (Pickles, 1995; Craig, Harris & Weiner, 2002). It became obvious during the interviews that many data sets are outdated, and often lack spatial accuracy (e.g. Interviewee No. A1). Efforts to scale down the collection of spatial data should be in the interest of local municipalities, as well as local communities, that is, if they know how to make use of spatial ICTs. Some interviewees showed motivation and expressed a willingness to contribute to the existing and new data sources (e.g. Interviewee No. 16). In this regard, several projects could serve as role models, such as FracTracker and MAPA (Turnbull, 2008; FracTracker, 2012).

(Geo-)Visualisation

The strength of PGIS would be to make use of this technology so that the product would be more meaningful to local communities. It could be used, for example, in consultation sessions and in informing citizens about planning strategies. The visualisation of spatial problems (such as contamination of water sources and transport routes of fracking fluids) is an essential element of PGIS and can have empowering effects for uninformed citizens (Kwan, 2002; Longley *et al.*, 2005).

Focus on citizen rights

Here is where another strength of PGIS emerges: a focus on citizen rights to information, participation and environmental justice (Carver, 2003). GIS enables the spatial analyses of visual impacts, environmental change and social dynamics. It would, in the case study area, be of vital importance to collect information on all of these factors. Experts have often bemoaned the limited availability of data so as to make informed decisions about the impacts of shale gas mining (Havemann, Glazewski & Brownlie, 2011). In order to collect the information, it would be advisable to include local experts; these should be scientific and non-scientific experts. An approach to be used could be the crowdsourcing of information (Goodchild, 2007; Goodchild & Glennon, 2010; Sui, Elwood & Goodchild, 2012).

Greater accountability and transparency

The mechanisms for community participation are petitions and complaints, comment procedures, meetings and hearings, consultation with community-based organisations and traditional authorities, and report backs to communities (LGMS, 2000, section 17(2)). All these instruments deny direct public decision-making, with citizens being enabled to contribute, but not to act. PGIS initiatives can lead to actual decision-making, but there is still a long way to go from here. Access to information should be guaranteed; access to technologies should be guaranteed; the adequate implementation of ideas and demands (according to a ‘keep-a-word’ principle); and the inclusion of as many different views and opinions as possible, should be put into practice.

Steps towards good governance

PGIS allows for the decentralisation of power and support grassroots democratic structures – both central features of good governance. There are several practical examples in the PGIS literature (Craig, Harris & Weiner, 2002). One core problem with the achievement of decentralised power and grassroots democracy is the access to and ownership of information (McCall, 2003).

PGIS create opportunities to visualise the spatial interests, needs and potential of groups, and help to operationalise local knowledge. In the study area, it would be possible to reveal the limitations and opportunities of shale gas mining for job creation, or of the potential impacts on biodiversity and agriculture, just to name a few.

Another problem with achieving good governance is that the application of PGIS should be embedded in a set of rules which lead to good governance. It is important that accountability, efficiency, transparency, equity, legitimacy, a respect for citizen rights and empowerment are well-defined aims of participatory decision-making (McCall, 2003).

Weaknesses

Difficulties reaching consensus

‘A camel is a horse designed by a committee’ as the aphorism has it; a weakness of the participatory GIS concept is that of reaching consensus. The means to deal with this weakness is, for example, the development of decision support systems combined with GIS (Evans, Kingston

& Carver, 2004; Jung & Sun, 2006; Fan-Chieh, Chien-Yuan, Sheng-Chi, Yu-Ching Shang-Yu & Kei-Wai, 2007). These systems include tools to build consensus on topics of dispute. Undeniably, the installation of such tools and software will be expensive and time-consuming.

However, the fact remains that building consensus relies heavily on the ability to arrive at tolerable solutions for everyone; technology cannot serve as a substitute. This is why Ramasubramanian (2010) and others emphasise the importance of the people involved in PGIS; their motivation and skills to find solutions cannot be underestimated.

Criteria of just decisions

An internal weakness of PGIS is that it climaxes at the point when decisions are made. The decisions are based on a very detailed process of problem definition, the inclusion of knowledge and power-related issues, but there is no ‘manual’ on how to judge the decisions; they are judged during the process itself. It incorporates a cyclic learning process and one that will be repeated many times to reach a situation which is acceptable to everyone. It is important to keep in mind, though, that the equity of the outcome of the decisions should be considered in order to evaluate the whole process. If this is not done, then the concept gives good advice, but nothing more. In this sense, the concept of participatory GIS could be rated as immature. In fact, critical GIS academics have called for attention to this, for example, Rambaldi, Chambers, McCall and Fox (2006):

Mapmaking and maps are a means and not an end. Spatial data and maps generated at community level are intermediate products of a long-lasting and articulated process wherein spatial information management is integrated with networking and communication (e.g. advocacy). (Rambaldi *et al*, 2006: 110).

In the case study area, PGIS could serve as a tool to increase an understanding of the (spatial) interrelationships between shale gas mining and human-environmental systems. Future generations in particular might suffer from decisions made today. Intergenerational equity should certainly be kept in mind when dealing with issues such as shale gas mining - a point which has been emphasised in the interviews with the local experts.

Empowerment and marginalisation

Another criticism which was expressed is the marginalisation of certain groups of society by the application of GIS (Harris & Weiner, 1998). Illiterate and older people especially, who are not used to new technologies, will find it difficult to learn using ICTs. Thus, this mental reservation will undoubtedly prevent those groups from participating. Solutions to this challenge are, for example, mixing low and high technologies and thus ensuring that participation is maximised.

Power struggles might arise from PGIS initiatives, which are caused by the internal configuration of the concept (Harris & Weiner, 1998; Kyem, 2004). It is clear that those in power are, in many cases, content with their situation; therefore, it is not very likely that they will readily welcome change. Moreover, it is likely that the ones in power will make an effort to prevent successful implementation. The internal weakness of PGIS is that it does not force anyone to act upon its own ideals. If decision-making power is not transmitted to the ones without it, then PGIS do not achieve their object which is ‘Power to the people’.

Knowledge of the masses

The results of the participatory process can be misleading. The problem is that the majority tends to oversimplify complex problems (Carver, 2003). This core dilemma of grassroots democracy is valid for participatory GIS as well. As stated earlier, PGIS does not measure the validity of its

outcomes; it is assumed that the inclusion of many views will lead to more informed decision-making.

Participatory GIS projects might render imprecise results, as in relation to the Wikipedia project, which is entirely participatory in character. The criticism of the inaccuracy of the data can be countered by stating that it is sometimes better to know a little than nothing (McCall, 2006). However, it should be noted when making use of crowdsourced information that there is a risk of uncertainty (Goodchild & Glennon, 2010). To deal with this issue of the quality of information is essentially significant, especially since one of the major charges of the participatory GIS supporters is the inaccuracy of conventional data sources and their lack of ground truth. Again, PGIS serves more as a means to an end than the solution to a problem.

This applies to the shale gas mining debate as well. If there is criticism stating that the information offered by Shell is too general and not enough (Havemann, Glazewski & Brownlie, 2011), then in turn, it should be possible for all to access adequate sources of information. Since not all information can be made public, it depends on the creativity of all involved stakeholders to make use of the available information.

Representations of unrepresentable conceptions of space

Another weakness of participatory GIS is the discrepancy between what is educible in a georeferenced coordinate system and what is generally known as mental maps; the interpretations of space which have developed by means of spatial thinking and perception. It is difficult to specify fuzzy boundaries in GIS because the location of an object is tied to a mathematical reference system. Several attempts have been made to address this problem, e.g. Jung (2009). However, it requires a high degree of expertise (Chang, Parvathinathan & Breeden, 2008).

Accuracy and precision are not always necessary (McCall, 2006). In the shale gas mining debate, it would be important to depict property claims, hazardous locations and natural resources with precision. In terms of culture and heritage spaces and community awareness, it would be helpful to consider overlapping areas and fuzzy boundaries. The distribution of critically endangered species is not static because they are subject to environmental change and other influential factors. Thus, it is inappropriate to consider them in clearly defined boundaries. The application of buffer zones around habitats of critically endangered species (such as the riverine rabbit) is therefore highly recommended.

A sense of place would be similarly difficult to express precisely on maps, but it could be attempted via artistic representations such as in Katie du Toit's 'Fear and Loss' project (Du Toit n/a). McCall (2006) and others suggest making use of dynamic, interactive maps and multimedia. This would add value to displaying "ambiguous, fuzzy, non-precise – even discursive and emotional – spatial knowledge and rich pictures of a multi-textured world" (McCall, 2006: 119).

Data sensitivity

Sensitive data are part of spatial information. These are, for example, residential data, socio-economic data, holy sites, hunting areas or medicinal herb collection areas (McCall, 2003). Participatory production and the use of sensitive data have to rely on the agreement that these are either publicly available or not. PGIS will not prevent data misuse, which is why certain safeguarding measures should be taken to avoid harmful results. This is particularly important when working with vulnerable groups, such as children, the elderly or the disabled. The measures adopted by the SPI-SYS project show that public institutions are well aware of this.

Financial constraints and time pressure

Participatory projects take time and they are cost-intensive; a weakness of the concept which puts great pressure on any project with limited resources. Costs can, however, be reduced by adding voluntary activities and making use of a range of funding means such as Google Outreach Initiatives and OLPC (One Laptop per Child 2012). The allocation of funds requires not only extra time and resources, but also a significant degree of motivation and patience. Incentives for participation would be, for example, adequate timeframes and the provision of ICT infrastructures, such as higher bandwidth connections, hardware and software requirements. ICT programs need regular updating and maintenance, and therefore continuous financing. PGIS by no means sells itself. It should be implemented as a long-term measure with an adequate budget taking into account costs and benefits. Besides setting up tangible milestones, a budget should allow for intangible achievements which should be qualified by means of explicit consensus and captured verbally in speech and writing.

Evaluating improvement

It is a complex task to determine the steps of improvement in a given situation. One first has to take stock of the situation at hand in order to define the deficiencies. The setting of standards is very difficult in the context of PGIS, as it comprises so many different approaches and applications. The three 'T's as defined by Corbett *et al* (2006) are impossible to standardise: transparency, time, trust. Every project requires different levels of these. Before implementing any project and programme, there should therefore be very precise aims defined to measure the outcome. This implies that participants should be involved in setting aims and standards from the beginning of the project (Rambaldi *et al*, 2006).

In the case study at hand, it would be possible to consider the deficiencies mentioned in the public participation process and the ones identified by Shell/Golder (2011). These could then be worked off step by step via PGIS, if applicable.

EXTERNAL OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (LOOKING AT THE STATUS QUO)

Administrative opportunities and threats

Many interviewees emphasised a lack of data-sharing initiatives in South Africa (e.g. Interviewees A1, A3). It is inarguably true for parastatal institutions, such as the Council for Geoscience or Eskom, which do not have an open policy concerning their spatial data. It is thus impossible to make use of the data, even with a restricted user group. This condition constitutes an administrative threat to a PGIS project, because theoretically, data would be available but practically they would not.

A network of organisations which have experience in the application of PGIS would be available via (online) platforms such as PPGIS.net (Public participatory GIS) or mailing lists, the QGIS (Quantum GIS) initiative, MAPA, Google Outreach and others.

The governmental and departmental initiatives, such as SPI-SYS, SA Risk and Vulnerability Atlas (SARVA, 2012), SA Environmental Observation Network (NRF SAEON, 2009) and SAEOS (Simplified Analytic Equation of State) (CoGIS, Qsens.is, and CSIR, 2009) are crucial developments in this regard as they offer municipalities and other stakeholders the opportunity to make use of geospatial technologies. Yet, it would consequently require massive funding to build up a functioning GIS infrastructure within municipalities (e.g. Spatial Information Units).

Threatening administrative factors are further high entry barriers, such as long-lasting bureaucratic procedures and legal conflicts (Interviewee A2). In the case of shale gas mining, these have been very effective in delaying decision-making and influencing participation.

Political opportunities and threats

In the case of shale gas mining, several interest groups have been active in lobbying their causes; for example, Treasure the Karoo Action Group, fractual.co.za, the Centre for Environmental Rights, Bird Life South Africa, among others. These provide entry points for collaborative GIS initiatives. For example, the Great Karoo Conservancy Constitution initiated by the Nama Karoo Trust (NKF, 2012) could serve as platform of communication between interested and affected parties. What is of crucial importance is the fact that associations, such as the Nama Karoo Foundation, are widely networked with other organisations.

A serious threat to a PGIS project is the political (in)significance of the study area. As has been pointed out earlier, the economic potential of the region is underestimated. The fact that it is not densely populated makes it less interesting to search for political partisanship than areas with larger numbers of potential voters (Atkinson, 2012). This affects fundraising and a general interest in developing the area. Without funds and motivation, a possible PGIS project is basically senseless.

Technological opportunities and threats

A major external opportunity for participatory GIS in general is (international) technological development, such as Google Earth and Open Street Map. These enable the use of spatial technologies for laypeople at no cost. They require no specific software licences and they offer potential for further development. However, the user has to have access to the Internet, which is costly in South Africa (ITU, 2012). External technical threats to a participatory GIS project would include the participants' lack of experience of GIS and of computers in general. During the interviews it became quite obvious that even officials positioned in appointments where professional GIS use should be mandatory did not know how to take advantage of it. Furthermore, some of the experts who were interviewed did not have much experience with GIS, although software is available and access to training is possible. It was stated that other tasks have become more urgent (e.g. Interviewee B4). However, the major problem of local municipalities is that no training is made available.

In some projects this issue has been addressed by the deployment of low technologies, such as participatory 3-dimensional modelling (P3DM) and other conventional participatory mapping exercises (IAPAD, 2012). This would definitely be an option, especially for areas with low bandwidth Internet connections and unreliable electricity infrastructure. Where Internet access is not a problem, as for example, in the vicinity of urban agglomerations, participatory GIS projects could make use of web GIS applications (Corbett *et al.*, 2012).

Economic and socioeconomic opportunities and threats

The global economic crisis has led to limited investments in the public and private spheres and spaces. In the study area, the global market's influence is felt most keenly in the demand for agricultural products and some natural resources (Interviewee B5). The result of declining turn-outs and sales affects public spending and therefore public funding of participatory projects. Strictly speaking, this is not entirely correct, because a PGIS project could indirectly influence these factors. For example, the private funding of a PGIS project could have positive and negative implications for economic development: it can either be a 'white elephant' or a worthwhile investment because it generates spin-offs and other multiple effects. However, in times of economic recession it would be very difficult to find private investors for a public

project and therefore it seems likely that economic development fosters the evolution of participatory GIS projects. A preliminary conclusion from this could be that the development of shale gas mining might have positive implications for PGIS, but not unless the revenues created from the gas industry are invested into poverty alleviation and participatory decision-making.

Socio-cultural opportunities and threats

As emphasised by Ingle (2010) and others, there is an entrepreneurial class present in the Karoo. They constitute a potential group of interested users of PGIS because it might accommodate their agendas. They are very likely to be connected in professional networks and the probability of this group being able to use ICTs is high. If we look at other social groups, such as poor and socially marginalised groups, their interests might be higher employment rates, improved public infrastructure (such as water and sanitation, schools, health care institutions and public transport facilities), and others. Similarly, this group could make use of PGIS to demonstrate their interests and negotiate for compensation. It was mentioned by interviewees that if shale gas mining goes ahead, then they are the ones who will suffer the most from the negative implications of the activity. It is therefore of utmost importance to consider gender-related issues, as well as equity issues for future generations.

In summary, it can be concluded that it would be worth the time, funding, and effort of local communities to make use of Participatory GIS or related ‘products’, as the benefits largely outweigh the deficits. Hopefully, this article will make a contribution in this direction.

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FROM THE RDP TO THE NDP: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE DEVELOPMENT STATE IN SOUTH AFRICA AS IT RELATES TO LAND REFORM AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

A. Karriem¹ & M. Hoskins²

ABSTRACT

The advent of democracy in 1994 had to contend with a state that bore the deep scars of the apartheid regime: inequality, poverty and unemployment. The ANC-led government believed that these issues could be addressed by an interventionist development state. In the light of this, the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) was launched – an attempt at redressing the inequalities of apartheid by transformation in the areas of the economy, employment, land ownership and housing. A second intervention was made in 1996 with the introduction of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme, a market-oriented programme whereby market forces would promote development. In 2011 the National Development Plan (NDP) was released, the aim of which was poverty eradication and job creation. This ambitious objective is considered against the actual performance of the state, given the major barriers of a weak bureaucracy and the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ (WB/WS) land policy. Drawing on developmental state theory, the state’s achievements since 1994 are critically evaluated. It is argued that the NDP’s objectives of eradicating poverty and creating jobs can only be realised through a transformative developmental state with a competent and dedicated bureaucracy and a centralised planning agency with a mandate to co-ordinate government departments and implement policies.

Keywords: Development state; interventionist state; transformative development state; state bureaucracy; centralised planning agency.

INTRODUCTION

Since the ushering in of democracy in 1994, the post-apartheid state has struggled to find a formula that is capable of addressing the deep social and economic ravages that apartheid wrought on the majority of South Africans. While some progress has been made in addressing the apartheid legacy, poverty, inequality and unemployment remain stubbornly high in the post-1994 period. For example, inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, actually worsened from .66 in 1993 to .70 in 2008 (Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn & Argent, 2010) and the poorest 70 per cent of the population only earned 21 per cent of total national income (Marais, 2011). In 2013 unemployment remained obstinately high at 25.6 per cent (Berkowitz, 2013), and almost 70 per cent of the rural population lived below the poverty line (Hall, 2004). In light of the extreme socio-economic cleavages experienced by the majority black population, the ANC-led government saw an interventionist state or a developmental state as the vehicle through which to transform the economy, create jobs and provide long denied needs such as land and housing.

¹Mr A. Karriem, Institute for Social Development, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa.

²Mr M. Hoskins, Department of Political Studies, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa.

The South African debate on the character that the post-apartheid state should assume has traversed the social democratic Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) which saw an activist role for the state to intervene and engender economic growth and redistribute wealth, and the market-oriented Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme which has reigned supreme from 1996 and given prominence to market forces in promoting development. In 2011, the government appointed the National Planning Commission, and released the National Development Plan (NDP) which commits the nation to “building a capable state” that will eradicate poverty and create 11 million jobs, including 1 million rural jobs, by 2030 (NPC, 2011). This article will critically assess the RDP and GEAR, and appraise whether the NDP’s ambitious targets are feasible in light of the performance of the South African state since 1994. More specifically, state performance in the land reform and rural development sectors will be investigated, where poverty and land inequality are extremely high.

The central argument is that a weak bureaucracy and the government’s market-oriented ‘willing buyer, willing seller’(WB/WS) land policy are major barriers to meeting the target of redistributing 30 per cent of white agricultural land to black farmers, creating jobs, and eradicating poverty. Moreover, it is asserted that the NDP, in leaving the market-oriented focus of land and agricultural policy intact, is unlikely to radically transform the agrarian sector or create a million new jobs in the agricultural sector. Finally, it is argued that the NDP’s objectives will only be achieved through a transformative developmental state with a skilled and competent bureaucracy, a centralised planning agency that has the power to coordinate and ensure that government departments work together and implement policies according to plan, and an active intervention in the economy and expropriation of land, if necessary, thereby meeting government objectives.

The article commences by reviewing the developmental state theoretical debate that draws especially on the East Asian experience. In Section 2.1, it investigates how scholars have drawn on some of the core requirements for constructing a developmental state in South Africa, critically evaluates state action in the post-apartheid period through the RDP and GEAR programmes, and then outlines what the NDP proposes to achieve. In Section 3 South Africa’s socio-economic profile in the post-1994 period will be briefly outlined. Then, in Section 4, land and rural development policy and implementation will be critically appraised. Section 5 comprises a critical analysis of the functioning of the post-apartheid state as it relates to land reform and rural development and it is argued that the dysfunctional nature of the state bureaucracy and a policy fixation on the neoliberal willing buyer, willing seller policy framework militates against the promotion of an on-going land reform and development programme that can create jobs, reduce poverty, and promote rural livelihoods. The functioning of the state bureaucracy and the role that a centralised planning agency can exercise in a strong, transformative developmental state are also interrogated. Finally, Section 6 concludes by summarising the central arguments of this article.

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

The term ‘developmental state’ generally evokes the East Asian experience of rapid transformations from poverty and economic backwardness to modernised, technologically advanced industrial economies. Chalmers Johnson, in his seminal analysis of Japan’s post-war economic modernisation, provided the original framework of the developmental state as one that “...sets specific development goals and then single-mindedly mobilises society to achieve industrial modernisation.” In this formulation, the state actively intervenes to ensure that developmental objectives are achieved instead of letting ‘market forces’ determine the allocation of resources (Gumede, 2009: 4). In their investigation of industrialisation processes in South Korea and Taiwan respectively, Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) similarly highlight the

discipline and guidance exercised by the developmental state over private firms. For example, in contrast to many middle-income countries, Amsden (1989) notes that the Korean developmental state subsidised targeted private sector industries, but enforced strict adherence to national development goals as a condition for accessing subsidies. In this regard, Onis (1991: 114) argues that the capacity of these developmental states to discipline and direct private business is explained by their "...unusual degree of bureaucratic autonomy".

State autonomy is widely acknowledged as one of the central features of successful developmental states. In his ground-breaking study, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*, Evans (1995) posits that a developmental state should be autonomous from society to ensure that it is not captured by powerful elites who seek to advance their narrow rent-seeking interests. However, he notes that the state must also be embedded in civil society networks that are committed to core national development goals. Evans distinguishes the developmental state from a patrimonial or predatory state (e.g. Zaire under Mobutu), which is captured by elite interests. To prevent elite capture, the state's decision-making bodies have to be insulated from all political and economic pressure groups, which Johnson (1986: 560) refers to as an "...open division of labour between reigning and ruling." In effect, this entails granting the bureaucracy sufficient scope to take the initiative and operate effectively (Johnson, 1982: 315). Specifically, the developmental state maintains its autonomy from predatory elites through the establishment of an effective Weberian-type meritocratic bureaucracy that is committed to the advancement of national development goals.

The success of the Korean developmental state and the implementation of its vision was dependent on the "brightness of the state bureaucrats", who were subjected to a rigorous system of recruitment (Amsden, 1989: 52). Effective, well-trained and skilled bureaucrats add to the autonomy of the developmental state because they are not beholden to the interests of predatory groups. They are able to negotiate with private groups employing both formal and informal channels but, in doing so, they do not compromise government goals. 'The best and the brightest' are, however, watched and guided by elite state bureaucrats who are "...enormously singled-minded and focused on the developmental goals" (Chang, 2009: 19).

In addition to a solid bureaucracy, theorists argue that there must be a strong degree of "coherence and co-ordination" within and between different state departments and agencies, so that different parts of the state are more responsive to the leadership and coordinating action of the state (Evans & Rueschmeyer, 1985: 55). Indeed, most successful development states had a strong central coordinating or planning agency with the power to intervene in departments and ensure that the state's long-term development plan was followed. For example, in Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), in Korea the Economic Planning Board (EPB), and in Malaysia, the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) drove and coordinated national development plans. These central planning agencies were located in the office of the head of state and, as Edigheji (2010: 7) notes, these agencies were staffed by highly skilled and competent bureaucrats who ensured that policies were implemented into development programmes, were insulated from predatory interests to prevent the hijacking of the state, and, more importantly, served as the "...nerve centres of development plans and policies." How South Africa's new National Planning Commission fares in comparison to East Asian planning agencies will be a good yardstick by which to assess the government's commitment to the establishments of a 'capable developmental state.'

The next section investigates how scholars, political parties, and development practitioners have drawn on developmental state theory to assess how it could inform the constructing of a developmental state in South Africa.

SOUTH AFRICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: FROM THE RDP TO GEAR TO THE NDP

Scholars, government officials, and civil society actors are all in broad agreement with the classical theorists that the construction of a developmental state is imperative if South Africa is to address the deep socio-economic legacies of poverty and inequality inherited from the colonial and apartheid periods. In fact, Gumede (2009: 13) states that for the ruling ANC government the building of a democratic developmental state is “simply not an option,” it constitutes a “moral imperative” because the nation’s continued stability is dependent on it. Moreover, Gumede (2009) – along with Edigheji (2010), Bodibe (2008), Turok (2008), Pillay (2007), and Pederis (2012) – raises some core aspects for a successful developmental state, which draws on the Asian experience: political will, a long-term vision and determination on the part of the country’s political elite to drive a development project, a meritocratic bureaucracy or an *esprit de corps* that places attainment of developmental goals and service to the country above personal and political interest, and the establishment of a coordinating centre or central planning unit that drives economic and social transformation.

South Africa’s debate around the character of the developmental state has traversed the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) of the early 1990s, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme in the mid-1990s to the notion of “Building a Capable State” as enshrined in the National Development Plan (NDP) of 2011. The ANC, via the RDP, saw the state as exercising a “leading and enabling role” in the economic and social transformation of the apartheid era economy and society; moreover, the RDP foresaw the necessity for a central planning agency to redress the “excessive departmentalism [that was] leading to uncoordinated, sometimes, contradictory decision-making by various state agencies” (cited by Makgetla, 2008: 151). To this end, the RDP Office, located in the presidency, was established in 1994 to exercise a coordinating role; however, it was understaffed, which limited its ability to coordinate and lead government programmes. In 1996, the RDP Office was closed, leaving the state without a strategic oversight agency. The closure of the social democratic-oriented RDP Office signalled the shift to the market-oriented GEAR macroeconomic programme, with government coordination now overseen by the Ministry of Finance (specifically the Treasury), which was more concerned with maintaining fiscal discipline than promoting broader developmental goals (Makgetla, 2008; Cosatu, 2005).

The move from the RDP to the GEAR also signalled a shift from an interventionist and redistributive to a broadly neoliberal framework. In contrast to the RDP, which promoted ‘growth through redistribution,’ the market-oriented GEAR was ensconced within a ‘redistribution through growth’ perspective, leading Pillay (2007: 201) to argue that the adoption of GEAR left the country in a:

“schizophrenic limbo between two conceptions of the state: on the one hand a neoliberal conception, where a procedurally democratic state is reduced to a facilitator of market-driven ‘development’, and obsessed with the fiscal deficit, and on the other, a substantively democratic developmental state that intervenes decisively to eliminate the social deficit”.

In line with its conservative orthodoxy, the state played a ‘facilitative’ role as GEAR’s market-oriented policies induced competitiveness in the industrial and agricultural sectors through deregulation and liberalisation of trade, and committed the country to a position of fiscal discipline. GEAR reigned supreme until President Mbeki was deposed at the 2007 ANC National Conference in Polokwane and replaced by Jacob Zuma. At Polokwane, the South African Communist Party, COSATU, and left elements within the ANC mobilised for the transformation of the South African state’s facilitative or *laissez faire* role into an active developmental one. As

the 2007 Conference resolutions noted, “There was a broad consensus to build a developmental state with specific South Africa characteristics” and that such a state will have the “capacity to intervene in the economy” to “address the challenges of unemployment, poverty, and underdevelopment” (ANC, 2008: 17). The Resolution on Rural Development noted that the “willing buyer, willing seller” approach to land acquisition has constrained the pace and efficacy of land reform. It is clear...that the market is unable to effectively alter the patterns of land ownership in favour of an equitable...distribution of land” (ANC, 2008: 27). In later sections, we will critically appraise whether the ANC’s policy documents approved at Polokwane led to a material change in the government’s land and rural development policy.

Polokwane was instrumental in the establishment of a National Planning Commission (NPC) that was tasked with drafting a long-term National Development Plan (NDP). The NPC set a number of goals that the NDP had to achieve by 2030: poverty must be eradicated; inequality reduced; employment must increase from 13 million in 2010 to 24 million through improved economic policy coordination and implementation; per capita income should be boosted from R50 000 in 2010 to R120 000; and a million jobs must be created in the agricultural sector, with land reform exercising an important role (NPC, 2011). The principal driver of these ambitious targets was the proposed ‘capable and developmental state.’

POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa is widely acknowledged as one of the world’s most unequal countries in terms of land and income distribution. In fact, inequality increased in the post-apartheid period, with Leibbrandt *et al* (2010: 10) finding that the Gini coefficient had worsened from 0.66 in 1993 to 0.70 in 2008. According to Statistics South Africa, the richest 10 per cent of the population receives 51 per cent of total income while the poorest 20 per cent earned just 1.4 per cent in 2005/2006 and, in an illustration of the extreme level of income distribution, the data showed that the poorest 70 per cent of the population earned only 21 per cent of total income (Marais, 2011: 208). These statistics are characterised by deep racial cleavages, with Africans overwhelmingly located in the poorest 70 per cent and whites in the richest 10 per cent. In addition, poverty is widespread, with almost 50 per cent of the population living below the poverty line of R524 per month per person (NPC, 2011). Poverty is geographically concentrated in rural areas, especially in the former homeland; however, it is also growing in urban informal settlements (Hall, 2004; O’Laughlin, Bernstein, Cousins & Peters, 2013).

Unemployment is a major problem confronting South Africa. According to Statistics South Africa’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey, the official unemployment rate rose from 24.9 per cent in the last quarter of 2012 to 25.6 per cent in the second quarter of 2013 while the expanded rate of unemployment (for those who have stopped looking for employment) rose to 36.8 per cent (Berkowitz, 2013). Disaggregating by race we find that the African and ‘Coloured’ communities suffer deeper levels of unemployment compared to whites and Indians. The extremely high rate of unemployment has had an adverse impact on the ability of poor households to ensure social reproduction and secure access to crucial services such as water and electricity, especially in a context where GEAR policies enforce cost-recovery. Not surprisingly, research by the HSRC found that almost 1.2 million people had their water supplies cut between 2002 and 2003 and another study focusing on 21 impoverished areas found that 18 per cent of households had their electricity disconnected for non-payment while 11 per cent had their water connections cut (Marais, 2011: 214-215). The inability to pay for services and/or the lack of access to basic services has generated what Alexander (2010) calls a “rebellion of the poor” or what has been colloquially referred to as the service delivery protests that have spread across small rural towns and urban metropolitan areas.

These socio-economic data provide a strong rationale for constructing a developmental state that will actively address deeply entrenched levels of poverty, inequality, and unemployment in South Africa. As we will argue, this means that the future capable developmental state cannot rely on a neoliberal model that will first grow the economic pie and then trickle down benefits to the poor; rather, this new state will have to actively promote economic development and simultaneously tackle the profound rural and urban inequities confronting South Africa's subaltern classes.

THE STATE, LAND REFORM AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

The developmental state has a central role to play in leading and sustaining rural development. This includes leading the process of land reform, promoting sustainable change in social and economic relations and supporting the goals of growth and development in the rural economy (ANC, 2008: 29).

The ANC is adamant that a developmental state has to exercise a "leading" or active role in promoting land reform and rural development. However, we need to provide a very brief overview of the history of rural social relations in South Africa before appraising how the ANC government has been leading the fight for land and rural development. Under colonialism and apartheid, millions of black South Africans were forced off the land. This land dispossession was officially codified in the Natives Land Act of 1913 and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, whereby the African majority was confined to 13 per cent of land in the native reserves, better known as the homelands or Bantustans. This state-driven process of "accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey, 2003) continued late into the 20th century: between 1960 and 1980 almost 3.5 million people were forcibly evicted from so-called "black spots" in rural white South Africa (Platzky & Walker, 1985). The colonial and apartheid legacy of violent land dispossession continues to shape South Africa's countryside in the post-apartheid era. Today South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in terms of land and income distribution, and almost 70 per cent of the rural population lives below the poverty line (Hall 2004: 214). By the end of apartheid, 86 per cent all agricultural land was controlled by 60 000 white farmers while more than 13 million black people still live in the overcrowded former homelands that are characterised by low levels of economic development and extremely high levels of poverty compared to the rest of the country (Lahiff, 2007: 1578).

To address high levels of land and income inequality as well as rural poverty, the ANC, through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), committed itself to redress historic processes of land dispossession through land reform, restructure the dominant white commercial agricultural sector, develop a strong black small farmer sector, and "...build the economy by generating large-scale employment, increasing rural incomes and eliminating overcrowding [in the former homelands]" (ANC, 1994: 20). On assuming power in 1994, the ANC took on the RDP agenda and set a target of redistributing 30 per cent of white-owned agricultural land to poor and landless black South Africans within five years. The state would provide redress through a three-pronged land reform programme that would a) restore land via the land restitution programme to those who were dispossessed under apartheid, b) provide security of tenure to those living in the former homelands through the land tenure programme, and c) redistribute land through the land redistribution programme to transform the racially skewed land holding pattern in south Africa (DLA, 1997).

The RDP is widely acknowledged as a social democratic manifesto with a redistributionist agenda; however, its market-oriented ideas militated against the transformation of the land and agricultural sectors. The ANC's land and agricultural policy was strongly influenced by the World Bank and committed the post-apartheid government to a market-led land reform programme that was based on a 'willing buyer, willing seller' (WB/WS) principle (Ntsebeza,

2007: 126; Williams, 1996). In 1996, this rightward shift in economic policy was consolidated when the ANC officially adopted the neoliberal-inspired Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme while maintaining the redistributionist rhetoric of the RDP. In line with GEAR, the 1997 *White Paper on South African Land Policy* officially embraced the WB/WS principle (DLA, 1997).

Between 1994 and 1999, the state primarily focused land policies on the landless and the rural poor via the land redistribution programme, which enabled them to access a Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) of R15 000 (later increased to R16 000). With the SLAG in hand, the rural poor (or willing buyers) were to identify a farm that they would purchase at market rates from willing sellers (white farmers). Since R16 000 was too little to purchase a farm; willing buyers had to pool their grants with other willing buyers to acquire land, leading to what analysts have called a ‘rent-a-crowd’ practice. The ANC-led state has moved from an interventionist policy position of nationalising and redistributing land to the poor as ascribed in the Freedom Charter to a ‘passive’ state that refuses to intervene in the land market. In other words, rather than actively intervening in the market and expropriating land in the public interest, the ANC-led state has become what Pillay (2007) calls a ‘facilitative’ state that mediates transactions between willing buyers and willing sellers. However, the term ‘willing buyer’ is a misnomer in that there is nothing enthusiastic or willing about this buyer; rather, state policy forces the rural poor to act as willing buyers in a market environment that is extremely unfavourable to them.

Once on the land, beneficiaries have struggled to make a living owing to limited post-settlement support. In addition, the R16 000 SLAG was too little to purchase land, construct housing, and secure agricultural inputs to build livelihoods, resulting in many land reform beneficiaries underutilising land (Hall, 2007; Aliber & Cousins, 2013). In 1999, a government review concluded that the pro-poor SLAG model was not reducing poverty nor creating jobs, so it established the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme, which was geared towards promoting a class of ‘viable’ black commercial farmers that would create jobs. LRAD provides larger grants ranging from R20 000 to R100 000, and depending on own contributions, the grant could rise up to a maximum of R400 000 (Aliber & Mokoena, 2005). While redistribution of land increased under LRAD, job creation and poverty alleviation have been modest. For example, in an analysis of LRAD land reform projects in the Vhembe and Capricorn districts of Limpopo Province, Aliber and Cousins (2013: 158) found that “From a livelihoods perspective...LRAD projects contributed little to poverty reduction, which the very modest labour intensification observed on some projects did very little to compensate. LRAD conspicuously failed to incorporate the poor and vulnerable as its main beneficiaries.”

In large measure, government commitment to a speedy redistribution of land was undermined by the adoption of the WB/WS policy: by 1999, less than 1 per cent of agricultural land had been transferred, leading the government to push the target of redistributing 30 per cent of land by 1999 to 2015; however, by February 2005, only 4 per cent of agricultural land had been redistributed, and by 2011 only 7.2 per cent. Given the slow pace of land delivery, government moved the date for achieving the 30 per cent target to 2025 (Hall, 2007: 88-89; O’Laughlin *et al.*, 2013).

FROM THE RDP TO THE NDP: WHAT FUTURE FOR LAND REFORM AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER A ‘CAPABLE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE’?

In spite of the problems noted above, the South African government views agriculture and land reform as having key roles to play in alleviating poverty and tackling high levels of unemployment. The National Development Plan (NDP) states that “...agriculture has the potential to create close to 1 million new [rural] jobs by 2030” and that “land reform” has a critical role to play in unlocking the “...potential for a dynamic, growing and employment-creating agricultural sector” (NPC, 2011: 219, 226). This ambitious target is to be achieved through what the NDP calls a “capable and developmental state”. The experience of land reform and rural development to date, however, suggests that this target is highly unlikely to be realised for a number of reasons. In this section, we investigate the underlining problems that have led to the failure to deal with land reform as an initiative to deal with poverty, unemployment and inequality. More specifically, we will focus on the ideology or politics of the government’s land reform policy as well as the NDP’s position on land reform and rural development, assess how a weak bureaucracy undermines government’s developmental goals, and argue that the construction of a strong planning unit is critical in coordinating government action and promoting greater synergy between different government departments.

THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

Politics play a crucial role in determining development success and failure. Indeed, as Adrian Leftwich (2005: 574-75) argues, the “...explicit promotion of development...needs to be understood essentially and explicitly as a political process.” A developmental state, as conceptualised by the classical developmental state theorists, is an autonomous, interventionist state; it drives the developmental project in contradistinction to the minimalist neoliberal state which leaves “...development...in the hands of market forces” (Pillay 2007: 205). The adoption of the market-oriented WB/WS land redistribution policy undermines this autonomous intervention, thus leaving the rural poor to the vagaries of the market. The poor willing buyers have not been adequately resourced by the state in the form of infrastructure and the necessary financial resources for them to make a living on the land. In the 1990s, the ANC’s GEAR macroeconomic policy followed the neoliberal prescription of liberalising and deregulating the agricultural sector by dismantling agricultural marketing boards, removing subsidies as well as tariffs on agricultural imports, and removing state services to the agricultural sector (Williams, 1996; Weideman, 2004; Macheche, 2008: 119; O’Laughlin *et al*, 2013: 9) – all of which has left South African agriculture with one of the lowest levels of state protection in the world (James, 2007). In addition, this has adversely impacted new land reform beneficiaries who are denied the generous subsidies and extensive infrastructure provided to white farmers under apartheid (Lahiff & Cousins, 2005).

The post-apartheid state’s rationale in applying neoliberal shock therapy in the agricultural sector was to make it more competitive to face the winds of global competition (Hall, 2004). A related rationale was that competition would weed out weaker white commercial farmers who would be forced to sell, thus releasing land for purposes of land redistribution and restitution and thereby create jobs. However, these market reforms instead produced a more concentrated large-scale commercial farming sector that became more capital intensive and shed labour. Marginal white farmers were forced off the land, but land did not necessarily end up in black hands; rather, much of the land was transformed into private game farms, nature reserves or was bought by large white commercial farmers. As intended, the neoliberal reforms led to the emergence of a smaller, leaner, more competitive, but also a more capital intensive capitalist agribusiness farming class that has become firmly integrated into the global economy. In addition, these reforms forced large farmers to:

[b]ecome hard-nosed, unsentimental and commercially minded...For farmers bent on economic survival, mechanisation and the use of agricultural chemicals such as pesticides and herbicides became preferable to creating employment, especially in the context of labour and tenure legislation (Atkinson, 2007: 77).

The neoliberal agricultural reforms, along with land tenure legislation which was meant to protect farmworkers from eviction, resulted in the expulsion of 2.4 million people between 1994 and 2004, with "...just under half of them actually evicted, the rest because conditions on the farms deteriorated so much" (Bundy, 2013: 27; Atkinson, 2007: 85). The high levels of farm evictions and the slow pace of land redistribution have led to a growing questioning within the ANC of government's steadfast adherence to the WB/WS policy in general and of neoliberal economic policy in particular. For example, at the Polokwane Conference in 2007, the ANC passed a resolution questioning the efficacy of the WB/WS policy (ANC, 2008), and senior ANC member, Ben Turok (2008: 11), argued that "...our society needs a transformational approach rather than a *laissez-faire* one." Despite this questioning of the market logic of land and agricultural policy, the hegemonic neoliberal faction of the ANC leadership has stated that the broad parameters of the NDP are not negotiable. What this means is that for as long as the politics of the NDP and the purported 'capable and developmental state' are rooted in neoliberal ideas and practices then the snail's pace of land delivery will continue, and the creation of a million rural jobs is likely to be still-born. A developmental state which lets market forces determine policy is highly unlikely to meet South Africa's pressing developmental needs. What is needed is a 'transformative' developmental state that will decisively intervene in the land market and expropriate land to ensure that the goals of eradicating poverty, reducing inequality, and creating employment in rural areas are realised. Moreover, this transformative state, in contrast to neoliberal minimalist state policy prescriptions, will have to provide agricultural extension support, credit, hybrids seeds, fertiliser, and infrastructure support such as irrigation schemes to ensure that small farmers are able to meet their consumption needs and sell excess produce on local markets and thereby improve livelihoods.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND AN EFFECTIVE BUREAUCRACY

The establishment of an efficient and disciplined bureaucracy is recognised as a key feature of successful developmental states. Moreover, successful developmental states maintain their autonomy from predatory elites through establishing Weberian meritocratic bureaucracies that are committed to advancing national development goals (Amsden, 1989; Gumede, 2009; Evans, 2010). While the South African state displays Weberian meritocratic characteristics (e.g. in SARS, the Treasury, and Ministry of Finance, where highly skilled personnel are employed), there is widespread recognition, including by government, that the bureaucracy is inefficient, lacks skilled personnel, has poor management, is beset by cadre deployment, and is dysfunctional in many provinces and municipalities – all of which undermine the realisation of developmental goals (Southall, 2006; Hemson, Carter & Karuri-Sebina, 2009; Von Holt, 2010). As Sampie Terreblanche (2009: 117) notes, "Instead of displaying a culture of service, the public service has become renowned for careerism, nepotism and even corruption, while many of its senior officials are guilty of doubtful moral behaviour." The growing number of corruption cases in which senior government officials, including many who are linked to the ANC, are involved brings to mind Evans's (1995) distinction between developmental, predatory, and intermediate states. Following Evans, South Africa would be classified as an intermediate state as it exhibits both predatory and Weberian features: sectors of the state bureaucracy are captured by predatory elites who feed their personal interests, but the bureaucracy also contains pockets of Weberian excellence and efficiency that are committed to a developmental project. The challenge for the

NPC will be on how to prevent elite capture, firmly combat corruption, and transform the state bureaucracy into a well-trained and capable one that effectively implements development goals.

The reason for poor state capacity is manifold. Baissac (2009), for example, attributes weakness in administrative competence and capacity to the 1994 regime change and overhaul of the public service which resulted in the loss of considerable knowledge and experience within government, as experienced white bureaucrats were replaced by often inexperienced black bureaucrats. This ‘changing of the guard’ occurred extremely rapidly, and without adequate knowledge management or skills transfer to maintain and improve service levels (Baissac, 2009: 12; Terrebanche, 2009). In addition, Von Holt (2010) explains how affirmative action and the skills’ shortage created numerous opportunities for upward mobility in the bureaucracy, generating a powerful culture of moving onward and upward. The culture of upward mobility encourages an attitude of ‘facing upward’ toward the next job prospect rather than focusing downward on improving the effective functioning of the state. Consequently, there has been a high staff turnover as public servants constantly move from one post to the next, which makes it difficult to create a stable environment and nurture skill sets for specific jobs. This orientation towards upward mobility and careerism undermines work performance and the construction of a stable functioning bureaucracy (Von Holt, 2010: 11).

A key consequence of weak administrative competence has been the outsourcing of government functions to consultants at great cost to the fiscus. For example, poor capacity in the then Department of Land Affairs resulted in “...legions of consultants [being invited] to assist” land reform beneficiaries “prepare their business plans.” In many instances, the consultants simply appeased the “fears of government officials (and thus getting their projects approved with relative ease) by offering rosy cash-flow projections that commonly even the consultants did not believe” (Aliber & Mokoena, 2005: 334). The need for building an effective bureaucracy is thus crucial if the NDP’s developmental goals of redistributing 30 per cent white-owned agricultural land to black farmers by 2025 and creating a million rural jobs by 2030 are to be realised.

A CENTRAL PLANNING AGENCY: THE NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION?

Most successful development states had strong central coordinating or planning agencies with cross-cutting powers to intervene in government departments and ensure that long-term development plans were implemented. For example, Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Korea’s Economic Planning Board, and Malaysia’s Economic Planning Unit took active roles in driving and coordinating national development plans. These central planning agencies were located in the office of the head of state and were staffed by highly skilled and competent bureaucrats who had the capacity to intervene in government departments and ensure that policies were implemented.

South Africa’s NDP and numerous government documents point to weak inter-governmental coordination as one of the principal challenges to be addressed by the state (NPC, 2011; Hemson *et al.*, 2009). This concern is a long-standing one, as the late Peter Mokaba, a former deputy minister of Environmental Affairs, noted in 2001: “...coordination of planning, budgeting and personnel still eludes us” (quoted by Gumede 2009: 10). While correctly diagnosing the problem of weak coordination, the NDP provides few specifics as to what a central coordinating agency would look like or whether the NPC would be that agency. Currently, the NPC is constituted by 26 part-time commissioners, the majority of whom are located in academia and the private sector. If South Africa is to ensure that its long-term developmental goals of eliminating poverty, reducing inequality, and creating 11 million jobs are met by 2030, it will have to build a strong planning agency that is rooted in the state and society. Moreover, if rural economies are to be revitalised through “improved infrastructure and service delivery” and increased “investments in

irrigation infrastructure” (NPC, 2011: 58), then a strong central planning agency will be of fundamental importance in cutting through interdepartmental inertia at the national level as well as ensuring that local, provincial, and national government agencies engage in coordinated action to deliver infrastructure and services.

CONCLUSION

Realising the extent of poverty and degradation of black people left behind by the ravages of apartheid, the newly installed African National Congress embarked upon a quest to correct these problems. Drawing on the economic success of Korea, Japan and Malaysia and attributing their successes to the developmental state, the ANC settled on the notion of the developmental state with South African characteristics as being the driver to correct the unemployment, poverty and income inequalities that persist to this day. This article confines itself to the developmental state and rural development; however, it was found that the South African state was not sufficiently capacitated in key areas to drive the process for rural development, especially with regard to making land available for production in the hope of heading off poverty, unemployment and income redistribution. To successfully head off these three scourges, the literature has indicated that of crucial importance were the key features of the developmental state apparatus as depicted in the classical developmental literature, which were not in place. A strong interventionist national development commission which had the powers to intervene in and steer departments towards the national goals of the developmental project were not in place; attempts at developing a capacitated Weberian bureaucracy were undermined by the tensions between upward mobility and selfless public service and of particular significance for land redistribution, the willing buyer, willing seller market-oriented redistribution mechanism has failed dismally in re-distributing land to previously dispossessed black people. The question then for further consideration, with the unveiling of the new national developmental plan for a new ‘*Capable Developmental State*’ and its ambitious targets with regard to land distribution and unemployment in the rural areas, is: Can it meet these targets by 2030 if these vital structural and policy weaknesses are not addressed or, is it going to be another well thought-out plan which litters our developmental history with no capacity or the necessary political willingness to see it through?

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TRANSFORMING LED PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH AFRICA

D. Van Rooyen¹ and D. Atkinson²

ABSTRACT

Local economic development (LED) should go beyond merely compiling documentation. Councils and officials in municipalities need to engage with communities and with the private sector to design appropriate strategies that unlock local potential.

However, the South African literature on partnerships has taken the form of regulated formal public-private sector partnerships (PPPs). Nonetheless, the soft factors of co-operation – trust and social capital – are absent. Therefore, ‘partnership’ where social capital and trust are used in the development of a region, can be considered essential for effective collaboration between state and non-state actors.

Consequently, to realise the potential for successful LED partnerships, there is the imperative to nurture an improved level of mutual understanding and trust between the partners. Local government, business, and community leaders should understand and respect one another's goals. Often, it is local government which has difficulty in accepting the profit motive of private investors, and enterprises are often tempted to walk away from the administrative decision-making processes used in the public sector.

This is perhaps the missing link in terms of LED partnerships. The researcher suggests using social capital, network governance, public-private dialogue and civic culture as alternative techniques to develop and ensure operational partnerships.

Keywords: Local economic development (LED); partnership; civic culture; social capital; public-private dialogue; public-private sector partnerships (PPPs).

INTRODUCTION

Local economies, whether static or vibrant, can be promoted further by effective partnerships (Lawrence, 2009: 24). From the inception of academic and policy discourse on Local Economic Development (LED) in South Africa, the theme of partnerships has been a recurring one (Helmsing, 2001; Abrahams, 2003; Nel & Binns, 2005; Rogerson, 2010a: 441; Rogerson, 2012b: 107). Although partnerships have always featured on the agenda, it does not mean that they are practised. Furthermore, partnerships have not necessarily been initiated with the precise terms and with the correct group of people.

The involvement of non-state actors, the private sector and civil society in local government-driven LED initiatives has been limited in South Africa (Lawrence & Hadingham, 2008: 44), even though “lip-service is paid to the concept of partnership-based development” in policy and national “debate” (Nel, Binns & Bek, 2009: 233).

Cohen (2010: 3) notes that LED officials often see their role as being “on the side of the people” as opposed to the side of formal business (Van der Heijden, 2008: 4). Therefore, smaller local authorities typically place a much stronger emphasis upon “participation” by marginalised communities in LED, rather than by the private sector (Cohen, 2010: 25). Municipalities tend to work well with ward committees, because they share a social and political heritage, but

¹Dr D. Van Rooyen, Researcher: Centre for Development Support, University of the Free State.

²Dr D. Atkinson, Director: Cluster on Sustainable Development and Poverty Alleviation
University of the Free State.

municipalities' interaction with business is much more constrained (Nel & Rogerson, 2007: 7). However, it is important that public-private dialogue occurs continuously for the increased effectiveness of government involvement in supporting private sector development (Lawrence 2009; Rogerson & Rogerson, 2011: 997).

LED strategies need to go beyond merely compiling LED documents. Both council and officials should engage not only with communities, but also with the private sector in refining, prioritising and designing appropriate strategies that unlock local potential (Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs [DCoGTA], 2009; Lawrence, 2009). These stakeholders should also be initiators, contributors, implementers, monitors and evaluators of development in their areas, so as to share risks and benefits (Stibbe, 2008: 4). Rowe (2009: 103) refers to this as an “interconnected web of interests”.

The improvement of the local business environment has been shown to be an essential step in catalysing LED activities and creating more competitive local economies able to attract and retain private sector investors (Toerien, 2005: 7; World Bank, 2010). Enabling conditions include factors such as outsourcing services, community planning and community leadership which are essential for the development and growth of the local business environment (Smith, 2000). The partnership between business and municipalities is also helpful for the creation of employment opportunities and for the stimulation of economic activity in a locality. This is truly the “lifeblood of LED” (Hindson & Vicente, 2005: 29).

A core problem as identified by Ruecker and Trah (2007: 47) is the need to construct “the necessary *soft factors* of co-operation” – trust and social capital – which are considered essential for the effective collaboration between state and non-state actors. “Without strengthening this trust between the local private and public sectors, little progress can be anticipated towards engaging the private sector in LED and creating a conducive local business environment” (Rogerson, 2012a: 138). The concept of civic culture has been developed in the American literature to describe and analyse the relationships between the state and the private sector at local level. However, not enough research exists about how communities, municipalities and the private sector can work together (Procurement Dynamics, 2007: 46).

Analysts studying LED have tended to focus on the form rather than the substance of the partnership (Hindson, 2003; Nel, 2001; Nel, Hill & Goodenough, 2007; Rodríguez-Pose & Tijmstra, 2007; Rogerson, 2009). Put differently, these analysts have tended to focus on who should be invited to the table, and less on what they must bring, and what their roles would be. Consequently, LED practitioners need to pay greater attention to social relationships and networks which fundamentally mould local economies.

This paper then firstly highlights that partnership is essential for successful LED initiatives. Secondly, several policies in South Africa refer to partnerships as a possible way of enhancing the service delivery of a municipality and creating the space for partnerships between municipalities and the business sector. Thirdly, the way partnerships are experienced is discussed. Lastly, possible solutions to partnership problems are recommended. These include social capital, network governance, public-private dialogue and civic culture.

PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The South African literature on partnerships has taken the form of regulated formal contractual public-private sector partnerships (PPPs). These partnerships form collaborations across the public and private sectors. Therefore, mutual gain can be facilitated for all parties instead of working separately or in conflict with one another (Rogerson, 2010a: 444). More and more municipalities are entering into PPP agreements to attract private sector participation in the

development, financing and operation of public sector infrastructure. PPPs are worth developing for long-term planning in the community (Local Government Digest, 1998b: 4). There has been limited attention paid to creating opportunities for more informal interaction between municipalities and organised business.

In South Africa, the private sector in partnership with municipalities has an important role to play in developing partnership models to ensure efficient infrastructure and economic and social development (Kruger, 2003:18). In such partnerships, the various rights and responsibilities of the parties need to be clearly specified (Government Digest, 2001: 6; KMMT & KPMG, 2000: 13).

Several of the national South African legal frameworks refer to partnerships as a possible way of enhancing the service delivery of the municipality. These frameworks create the space for partnerships between municipalities and the business sector. It is conceivable that PPPs *may* encourage general co-operation between business and municipalities, but they may well not. Should they do so, the social development will also eventually improve.

In Section F of the White Paper on Local Economic Development it is envisaged that the private sector become involved to assist in providing services that are typically in the realm of local government (RSA, 1998b). There are two types of agreements. The first involves the performance by a private party of an ‘institutional function’ for, or on behalf of the municipality. This private party will perform some of the duties of delivering municipal services. A second agreement might allow some form of ‘use of state property’ by a private party for own commercial gain. The municipality transfers the right of use of a moveable or immovable asset to the private party. Here, the municipality does not contribute to the private party but shares in the revenue generated (Botha, 2005: 15).

The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998) is specific in its inclusion of a partnership as the best method to deliver the necessary services to the community (Zybrandts, 2002: 40). Sections 44 and 56 deal with the functions and powers of the executive committees and the executive mayor respectively. They are responsible for determining what the communities’ needs are, for prioritising the needs and for recommending strategies, programmes and services to address these needs (RSA, 1998a). The best method to meet these needs is the creation of partnerships.

The Draft White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships (MSP) was published in the Government Gazette No. 21126 on 26 April 2000 (RSA, DPLG 2000). The draft was never formalised but was implemented in several municipalities (Heyman, 2002: 4; KMMT & KPMG, 2000). This White Paper recommends that municipalities look at alternative ways to accelerate the delivery of municipal services. It aims to provide a framework where resources of public institutions, community-based organisations (CBOs), NGOs and the private sector meet the country’s development objectives. The national government has emphasised public-private, public-public and public-community partnerships (Frödin, 2009: 294; Pickering, 2001: 4).

Moreover, Chapters 5, 6 and 8 of the Local Government Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) contain various clauses that highlight the need for the local government to address the basic needs of the community. These chapters deal with integrated development planning, performance management and service rendering respectively. This creates opportunities for possible private sector involvement (RSA, 2000a). In Section 76, two possible mechanisms for municipal service delivery have been identified. The first is based on the internal mechanisms within a department, the administrative unit or business unit within the municipality. The second utilises external mechanisms which may be “...any other institution, entity or person legally competent to operate a business activity” (Zybrandts, 2002: 40).

The Act prescribes a three-phase process to consider such service mechanisms. Firstly, Section 77 highlights various obligatory procedures to review service mechanisms. Various circumstances are elaborated, such as the integrated development plan (IDP), new municipal services or performance evaluations which municipalities must review and decide on the appropriate mechanism to provide municipal services. The scope is broad and municipalities should go through this process annually. Section 78 then prescribes matters to be considered when choosing between internal mechanisms or external mechanisms. Each municipality should first look at the direct and indirect costs of the projects, as well as the municipality's capacity and the impact on job creation before deciding whether the project will be managed internally or whether it needs external assistance.

Secondly, Section 78(3) specifies the required process when a municipality contemplates the possibility of an external mechanism of service delivery. There are several institutional options (KMMT & KPMG, 2000: 12; Local Government Digest, 1998b: 2). Ring-fencing is a simple budgeting technique separating different services, such as water and sanitation. Service contracts enable municipalities to contract with private firms to provide municipal services on its behalf, such as maintenance, repair and billing. Management contracts enable private companies to take overall responsibility for specific services with significant autonomy (Local Government Digest, 1998a: 17). Leasing enables a private firm to collect user charges for the provision of a service, in return for which it pays a leasing fee to the municipality. Concession is a long-term contract, whereby the private firm maintains and expands infrastructure, and remains responsible for operation and maintenance. Community and user provision enable communities to enter into self-help arrangements for the provision of small-scale infrastructure (Local Government Digest, 1998a: 18). Finally, privatisation entails the sale of a public service to a private firm which would provide revenue for government operations.

Phase 3 elaborates on the external mechanisms for service provision. If the service provision leads to a public-public partnership, the negotiation occurs with the public partner. However, if a CBO, NGO or private sector service provider is used, a competitive bidding process (tendering) must take place (Section 83) (Zybrandts, 2002: 41). The Act clearly stipulates that small, emerging enterprises should be promoted and that the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (No. 5 of 2000) should be considered (RSA, 2000b).

In contrast, if municipalities prefer to use internal service provision mechanisms, they need to allocate sufficient human, financial and other resources necessary for the proper provision of the services (Section 79 of the Local Government Municipal Systems Act).

In addition, in Section 168 of the Municipal Finance Management Act (Act No 56 of 2003) (MFMA) (RSA 2003) regulations for private-public partnerships (PPPs) are issued. The key aim of a PPP contract is to provide high quality services that will result in a net benefit to the municipality, which will consequently result in value for money to the taxpayer. However, the failure to produce clear guidelines about the creation of PPPs inhibits the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the co-operation of private sector interests (Government Digest, 2001: 5).

The 2006 National Framework for LED (Stimulating and Developing Sustainable Local Economies) was issued by the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG). It stipulated ten guiding principles. One of the principles was that "...private companies, including social enterprises and co-operatives, form the heart of the economy" (Cohen, 2010: 7). Therefore, they have a crucial role to play as partners with the public and community role players that will ultimately stimulate robust and inclusive local economies.

The provision of such partnerships was not really seen as part of LED, but rather as options for cost-effective service delivery. Policy documents often refer to the possibility of partnerships, but

how they should be formed and the roles and responsibilities are not outlined for the different parties. “An intrinsic overlapping of interest between business and the public sector...” could reveal a shift towards more effective LED (Stibbe, 2008: 3).

THE PRACTICE OF PARTNERSHIPS

South African policy documents tend to focus on formal PPPs, as well as LED, but seldom clarify the links between them. However, LED is often considered more important than PPPs. Perhaps if a civic culture (briefly discussed later) functions well, with constant and co-operative interaction between municipalities and the private sector, then PPPs are likely to work more efficiently. Both parties will have a much better understanding of the problems to be solved, as well as the possibilities for capital investment, revenue generation, technological improvements, and the requirements of operations and maintenance (O & M). Where such friendly interaction does not exist, there is likely to be distrust between the parties, and the contracts are likely to be written on the basis of such suspicions, rather than on the basis of mutually beneficial regulations (Smith, 2009). Municipalities are likely to want more revenue from these operations than the private sector believes can be realistically generated. In addition, municipalities are likely to set very constrictive monitoring requirements which are onerous with which to comply.

The term ‘partnership’ is ambiguous. There are different meanings, possibly on a continuum of formality, ranging from very formal PPPs to very informal, casual, and friendly *ad hoc* interactions. Sometimes it refers to formal PPPs and at others, to informal friendly relationships.

In this paper, the second definition of ‘P’ is more important. Friendly, ongoing interactions are required. This may lead to positive reciprocal influence, whether in municipal policies or in private investment decisions: at a later stage, it may lead to more concerted joint initiatives. During this stage, it actually qualifies as LED. However, such LED may be very successful without PPPs ever being introduced. The partnerships required by LED initiatives refer to the type of civic culture in existence, and not formal or artificial PPPs.

In 2003, Meyer-Stamer wrote a key paper entitled ‘Why is LED so difficult?’ (2003: 2). This paper critically evaluates international LED programmes as follows:

In those developing countries where LED has been going on for a number of years, it is difficult to discern stunning success stories . . . Even in OECD countries there are not many LED success stories. One cannot help but wonder: Is the popularity of LED perhaps more due to desperation than to a convincing track record?

The international experience of LED during the 1990s points to the need for involving the private sector in local development initiatives (Meyer-Stamer, 2002). Such involvement could promote market-, resource-, or innovation-seeking motivations (Froy, 2009; Government Digest, 2001: 4; Nel, Hill & Goodenough, 2007: 44; Rogerson, 2009: 53). Furthermore, partnerships are becoming popular as proponents believe that they can enhance the municipal lack of skills and resources, as well as broaden the overall socio-economic contribution that the partners can make (Heyman, 2002: 4; International Council on Mining and Metals [ICMM], 2010). Partnerships could be the vehicle for expanding the involvement and impact of the private sector. Through the building of partnerships “...the advantages of the private sector – dynamism, access to finance, knowledge and technologies, managerial efficiencies and the entrepreneurial spirit – are combined with the social responsibility, environmental awareness, local knowledge and job generation concerns of the public sector” (Srinivas, 1999: 25).

The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy advocated that the business sector had a vital role to play in the overall development of an area. Nevertheless, the South African government still chose to focus more on municipalities as the key change agent in initiating and

supporting LED (Hindson, 2003; Nel, 1997). LED has thus, rightly or wrongly, come to be perceived as a local government mandate stemming from the Constitution. According to Rogerson (2009: 50; 2010b), the private sector has either been left out or has chosen not to be involved as a result of the mutual suspicion that exists between the public and private sectors, thus making dialogue between the two groups extremely difficult. In some instances, the private sector is seen as a useful cash cow (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2006:75) and the many other potential contributions which the private sector can make tend to be ignored (Procurement Dynamics, 2007: 46). Partnerships do not automatically achieve positive outcomes: if the partnership is regulated, structured and managed they could improve and increase service delivery (Heyman, 2002: 5). According to Rogerson (2009: 61), a municipality also “...needs to engage, honestly and systematically, with its own private sector in order to work out exactly what the hurdles are to a local business development area, which of them can be ameliorated at a local level and then to work out a reform programme”.

Mistrust is premised on divergent ideological beliefs and correspondingly different priorities (Hadingham, 2008: 54). In essence, the public sector believes business is anti-poor and business believes that government is welfarist and anti-profit in its outlook. Thus, it appears that these groups speak different languages (Hadingham, 2008) and in South Africa, these are often different actual languages as well. However, the horizontal co-operation of actors, such as the private sector and the local community, is key to the sustainability and success of LED initiatives (Abrahams, 2003: 190; Hindson, 2003; Nel, 2001: 1019; Nel, Hill & Goodenough, 2007: 44; Rodríguez-Pose & Tijnstra, 2007; Rogerson, 2009: 53).

In South Africa, private sector apathy towards municipality-led LED initiatives “...has been further enhanced by its experience of municipal bureaucracy, red tape and unproductive talk shops where much is promised but little of benefit to the private sector is actually produced” (Lawrence & Hadingham, 2008: 44). Hindson, Meyer-Stamer, Schoen and Wegmann (2009: 1) assert that “...addressing red tape is an important building block of a LED initiative”. Opportunities for encouraging private investment are often lost because of the low priority accorded by the municipality to improve the local business environments (Department of Provincial & Local Government [DPLG], 2008). The inherent tensions between the public and private sectors are compounded by the need to transcend the apartheid legacy of a mainly white-owned and -controlled private sector and a predominantly black public sector.

Herzberg and Wright (2005) point to the need for developing “competitiveness partnerships” – a structured dialogue between the government and the private sector – in order to improve the investment climate. The core value of such dialogue and partnerships is twofold. Firstly, governments that listen to the private sector are more likely to design credible and workable reforms. On the other hand, entrepreneurs who understand what a government is trying to achieve with a reform programme are more likely to be constructive and supportive (Herzberg & Wright, 2006: 1).

The question arises as to why mutual suspicion between municipalities and the business sector exists in South Africa. The answer could possibly be the lack of a civic culture in which councillors and officials develop trusting relationships with business people over an extended period.

Furthermore, according to Nel (2001: 1018), many areas have low levels of civic involvement and therefore municipalities cannot develop their own local models of LED. Municipalities tend to focus on pro-poor LED initiatives for development, thus encouraging several pieces of legislation to intervene pro-actively in their local economies in order to create employment and reduce poverty (Nel & Rogerson, 2005). This was approached in terms of skills development, job creation, and infrastructure provision, as well as informal small-, medium- and micro-enterprise

(SMME) support. Such projects tend to exclude the private sector, whereas city municipalities tend to focus on pro-growth LED (Nel, Binns & Bek, 2009: 235). This type of LED depends on a vibrant, durable civic culture being established which takes years of effort.

Pro-growth initiative trusts, PPPs and racial differences are all important factors that influence an effective sustainable LED. Nevertheless, these will always depend on the type of municipal-private relationship which translates into a civic culture concept.

Recent research provides some insight into the challenges associated with improving the local business environment for more effective LED in South Africa (Rogerson, 2012a: 133). Suggestions of making use of local chambers of commerce and local economic development agencies (LEDAs) have been made. But at present, the ‘soft’ factors, such as trust and social cohesion, are lacking in the debate of partnerships (Herzberg & Wright, 2005; Ruecker & Trah, 2007: 47). This is perhaps the missing link in terms of LED partnerships.

‘SOFT FACTORS’: THE MISSING LINK IN LED PARTNERSHIPS

In a previous section, policy documents of South Africa were discussed in terms of partnerships. Lidström (2008: 392) tested three sets of explanations for political trust at local level that correlate with how the area assesses the state of the local business climate. These three explanations were social capital theory, a theory of local well-being and political-institutional conditions. These three explanations will feature in the sections that follow on public-private dialogue, network governance, social capital, and civic culture.

PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIALOGUE

Dialogue between the public and private sectors has recently become popular as a way of promoting the right conditions for a good business environment and poverty reduction. There is an emerging body of case studies and research papers on techniques for promoting successful dialogue, including several studies in East Africa, the Pacific Islands, Eastern Europe and South America by the World Bank, the Department of International Development (DFID), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Centre. In February 2006, these organisations co-planned the first International Workshop on Public Private Dialogue (PPD) held in Paris and attended by 100 stakeholders from 30 countries. Participants at the workshop drew up the Charter of Good Practice in using Public Private Dialogue for Private Sector Development.


PPD comes in many forms: it can be structured or *ad hoc*, formal or informal, wide-ranging or focused on specific issues. It can be initiated by forward-thinking governments, frustrated entrepreneurs, or third parties such as international donor agencies or non-profit organisations (Herzberg & Wright, 2005).

PPD is an institutional arrangement that brings together a group of public and private sector actors (Frödin, 2009: 299). PPD discussion forums range from the highly formal and structured to the more informal and *ad hoc* with initiatives lasting from only a few hours or continuing over several years (Bannock Consulting, 2005). Governments that engage in PPD are more likely to promote sensible, workable reforms, while enterprises participating in meaningful PPD processes are more likely to support these (Bannock Consulting, 2005; Herzberg & Wright, 2005).

Before a PPD can be fruitful, municipalities first need to understand that by collaborating with the private sector, they stand a better chance of achieving their development objectives and improving their revenue base. For its part, the private sector should understand its obligations but also its right to demand accountability and better services, such as good infrastructure (OECD, 2006: 78).

The PPD concept can be portrayed by means of a PPD ‘diamond’. This is used as a conceptual framework for mapping the strength and weakness of four essential elements of PPD on a vertical and horizontal axis (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: PPD ‘Diamond’



Source: Herzberg (2004)

These include the public sector (capacity, political will to engage, and leadership), the private sector (organisation, leadership, motivation), champions (credible and respected individuals with the motivation and ability to attract the attention of stakeholders) and instruments (quality of programmes and mechanisms to help private sector development) (Herzberg, 2004).

NETWORK GOVERNANCE

Network governance is an attempt to increase the importance of NGOs, the private sector, scientific networks and international institutions in the performance of various functions of governance (Dedeurwaerdere, 2004: 2). The main aim of network governance is to create a synergy between different competences and sources of knowledge in order to deal with complex and interlinked problems.

Networks have been widely recognised by both scholars and practitioners as an important form of multi-organisational governance. The advantages of network co-ordination in both public and private sectors are considerable, including enhanced learning, more efficient use of resources, increased capacity to plan for and address complex problems, greater competitiveness, and better services for clients and customers. (Provan & Kenis, 2007: 230).

Based on the perspective of “network governance”, the municipality therefore should play its role as administrator in the system of LED. The business sector can then play its role as the economic component in terms of investment and financial budgeting. According to Cohen (2010: 16), the concept of LED networks is mentioned in several of the DLPG’s Policy Guidelines as a general idea but with very little practical guidance for local authorities on how these should be established or maintained, or how to extract value from these networks.

SOCIAL CAPITAL

Maloney, Smith and Stoker (2000) argue that the municipalities can, and possibly should, play a substantial role in creating the conditions for social capital. To build social capital effectively,

municipalities should share decision-making with citizens, as well as inform citizens about decisions made, thus moving beyond their roles as controllers, regulators and providers to new roles as catalysts, conveners and facilitators (Warner, 2001).

The concept of social capital refers to relationships and trust in other individuals, social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness, and its impact on the local economy (Blair & Carroll, 2009; Putnam, 2000:19). This type of social capital is what Woolcock (2001) refers to as “linking social capital” when connections are made between those with differing levels of power or social status (engaging vertically with external agencies). Relationships between organisations in a network can be formal through contracts, rules and regulations (Coleman, 1990), but should also be maintained in an informal way through norms or mutuality and trust (Alter & Hage, 1993). PPPs have maintained very formal contracts thus far and therefore the informal network aspects of mutuality and trust have often been absent.

Trust is necessary for co-operative behaviour (Jones & George, 1998). The concept of trust concerns dealing with risk and uncertainty, as well as accepting vulnerability. Newell and Swan (2000: 1295) suggest a three-fold typology of trust. Firstly, companion trust refers to trust that is based on judgements of goodwill or personal friendships. Such trust will develop over time as people get to know one another personally through continuing, reciprocal exchange. Secondly, competence trust is based on an attitude of respect for the technical, cognitive, organisational and communicative abilities in the partner to complete their share of the job at hand (Klein, Woolthuis, Hillebrand & Nooteboom, 2005: 814). The development of this form of trust thus relies on perceiving the competencies of the other partners. These judgements can also be driven by contextual cues, such as the reputation of the institution for which the person works or the status of the professional group to which she belongs. Lastly, commitment trust is developed on an institutional basis. Each of the parties expects to gain mutually from the relationship and only rarely will the formal contract be used to settle conflicts between the parties.

Social capital can bring a broad range of benefits to society. One of the most important of these is the capacity to improve economic well-being (Zhang, Anderson & Zhan, 2011). Furthermore, social networks, the key elements of social capital, have impacts on economic well-being in three principal respects. Firstly, they help to deliver trustworthy and easily accessible information. Secondly, they help maintain good market order through reward and punishment mechanisms, such as group exclusion or reputation recognition. Finally, they foster trust, which reduces transaction costs and facilitates economic actions. Trust and norms are also often used as indicators of social capital independently when examining their impacts on economic well-being (Zhang *et al*, 2011: 122).

CIVIC CULTURE

Putnam (1993: 167) invokes the concept of social capital as the basis of civic culture and defines it as “...features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of a society by facilitating co-ordinated actions”. Whereas PPPs have always been a policy development, civic culture is an analytical term to enable the description of certain relationships; in this case, the relationship between municipalities and business.

Reese and Rosenfeld (2002a: 41) note that the concept of civic culture includes the structure of local economic decision-making (competitive environment *vis-a-vis* other localities), the process through which decisions are made (locus of primary power), the interests involved in decision-making, and the decision-making styles evident in the local public arena (world views of participants, how goals are set, how a community envisions itself, language, symbols and myths, and the perceived proper role of government).

There are various types of civic culture. One type can be described as an inclusive civic culture from which candidates are usually drawn and receive the support of many segments of the community, businesses, citizens, and volunteer groups. Compromises in these communities are often made because all the groups agree on working together to develop the local community (bootstrap goals) (Reese & Rosenfeld, 2002b: 9).

South Africa has seen only a few of these attempts to create an inclusive local civic culture. Graaff-Reinet could be considered reasonably successful where LED has been considered as an all-embracing holistic endeavour where the municipalities (district and local), the business sector, as well as the community in general, have developed relationships to enhance the locality (Atkinson & Ingle, 2010). In this Karoo town, a community ethos exists because more trust and co-operation subsists. Business is given more leverage and decision-making processes take place within public-private collaboration. The Cape Town Partnership is another excellent example where the business sector and government have formed a useful partnership (Rogerson, 2006). Established in 1999, this partnership consists of the City of Cape Town, the South African Property Owners Association (SAPOA), and the Cape Town Regional Chamber of Commerce and Industry and other stakeholders. The Cape Town Partnership is a development facilitation agency focused on the mobilisation, co-ordination and alignment of public, private and social resources behind the urban regeneration of Cape Town's central city. This brings private and public operators together to drive urban regeneration.

Real LED partnerships require a realistic understanding by municipalities of the economic dynamics of the community, such as the investment, multipliers, infrastructure and place-marketing potential. Business organisations need to understand the importance of municipalities to satisfy political goals, particularly the voting power of the working class. These partnerships require a great deal of political realism and tolerance on both sides.

CONCLUSION

“Public and private goals do not necessarily need to be the same for partnerships to work - they must merely be compatible” (Srinivas, 1999: 17). In order to realise the potential for successful LED partnerships, Rogerson (2010a: 455) concludes that there is an imperative to nurture an improved level of mutual understanding and trust between the partners. Government, business, and community leaders should understand and respect one another's goals. Often, it is the case that government has difficulty in accepting the profit motive of private investors, and enterprises are often tempted to walk away from the administrative decision-making processes used in the public sector. Trust and co-operation are essential for achieving locally-driven efforts at community development. LED can only be truly effective when local people or groups seize the initiative and engage in actions which unify communities, business and other relevant authorities in their local area in a joint endeavour to improve their economic and social conditions (Nel, 2001: 1006).

The international focus in LED practice is generally now more geared towards investment in human capital development, public-private partnerships, retention and expansion of existing local firms, support for SMMEs, workforce development and training and a general move to a more targeted inward investment focus (World Bank, 2003). All of these require vibrant collaborative relationships between municipalities and the business sector to diversify the initiatives, draw in more stakeholders and maximise the potential success and benefits of the process (Nel, 2001: 1019). Analysts have tended to focus on who should be invited to the table, and less about what they must bring, and what their roles will be. Therefore, the issue of civic culture becomes a *sine qua non* for effective LED. Consequently, LED practitioners need to pay greater attention to social relationships and networks, which fundamentally mould local economies.

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THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: SANITATION OPTIONS AND NATURAL RESOURCES

M.A. Wienecke¹

ABSTRACT

The provision of water and sanitation has been a regular feature in headlines in Southern Africa. Governments in the SADC region have spent enormous amounts of money on waterborne systems. This one-sided approach has to be questioned as there are numerous alternatives available. Alternative technologies and approaches include Urine Diversion Systems, dry sanitation, and biogas. The questions include: why are these alternatives not widely used or does the problem lie with either the alternatives or the decision-makers? However, it seems that few decision-makers and potential beneficiaries know or understand these viable alternatives.

This paper provides an overview of selected sanitation options, both dry and wet systems. Based on research in Southern Africa, the advantages and disadvantages of options will be highlighted, together with their impact on the environment. Government approaches will be examined, regarding the use of resources such as water and sanitation services. Factors, such as demand and supply, affordability, essential requirements for the operations and maintenance of the conventional and alternative sanitation systems, and the role of natural resources, will be considered. Out-of-the-box thinking is essential, including a critical assessment of available possibilities. Water should not be the only natural resource to be considered, as sanitation is the source of natural resources too.

Keywords: Ecological sanitation; appropriate technology; faecophobia; Southern Africa; resources; water.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SANITATION

Several parts of South Africa are described as ‘water scarce’, owing to the aridness of some areas, such as the Karoo, or to insufficient water resources available locally, such as Gauteng. The latter is experiencing a considerable increase in demand due to the growth in population and industrial activities. Local governments are struggling to provide water and sanitation services to the rapidly-growing number of residents. Some initiatives have attempted to encourage alternative sanitation systems.

The meaning of the term technology has undergone changes over time. The term *technologia* was derived from *techne*, a discourse on the arts (Capra 2003, 80). When it was used for the first time in English in the 17th century, it referred to the systematic discussion of the ‘applied arts’ or crafts. In the 20th century the term included tools or machines, and the non-material methods and application of techniques. The increasing complexity of technologies has been the result of increasing demands for services by growing industries and by a burgeoning global population. This has required specialists in a variety of technical fields and increasing capital requirements to construct more and more complex systems.

Various water-based sanitation systems were invented in Egypt, Greece, China and India. Historical evidence shows that in the year 2500 BC, the people of Lothal, India, had waterborne toilets in each house. The system was linked by drains covered with burnt clay bricks. Manhole covers and chambers facilitated operations and maintenance (Pathak, no date). None of the earliest attempts succeeded in becoming a widespread product. It required a major health crisis in

¹Dr M.A. Wienecke, University Centre for Studies in Namibia (TUCSIN), Windhoek, Namibia.

nineteenth century Europe to lead the way to what is today an internationally promoted approach – waterborne sanitation.

Pathak (no date) described the period from 500 to 1500 AD as “a dark age from the point of view of human hygiene”, where cesspools and human excreta were widespread. The rich in India had housing and forts with protrusions in which to defaecate. The excrements then fell into the open ground or into the river below. In Europe it was an era of chamber pots, cesspools and close stools and, similar to India, toilets protruded out of the castles to enable the excrement to fall into the river.

In 1550, Henry II proposed directing some sewers of Paris into the Seine (Thorndike, 1928:193). This was vetoed by the municipal authorities on the grounds of danger to the public health, since half the population depended on the river for water for cooking and drinking purposes. “Formerly sewers had drained into the river, but the municipality had learned its lesson as nineteenth-century England was to learn its” (Thorndike, 1928:193). During 1596, Sir John Harrington introduced the first water closet flush toilet for Queen Elizabeth I of England, when most households had earth toilets, which used earth instead of water, which did not solve the problem of cleaning (Pathak, no date).

The water closet was not adopted on a large scale until the nineteenth century, when urban conditions in Europe and America deteriorated. A New York newspaper editor described the conditions in 1857 as follows (Larsen 1969, 239):

“With the exception of a very few thoroughfares, all the streets are one mass of reeking, disgusting filth, which in some places is piled to such height as to render them almost impassable by vehicles. ... The dirt, like an epidemic, prevails all over...”.

Leeds was one of the first towns in Britain where piped water was provided to houses (Sellers, 1997:4). The system came into operation in 1694. During the industrialisation phase, the few existing sewers discharged directly into the local river. In 1842 the Leeds Improvement Act was promulgated (Sellers, 1997:6), which stated the following:

"It shall be lawful for the Council from time to time to cause such common sewers, drains, vaults, culverts, watercourses, wells and pumps as they may think necessary to be made and constructed in or under any streets within the limits of this Act."

Three proposals were received to implement the new law. They reflected very different perspectives, which are today still present. The first proposal drained all effluent directly into the river, because “it is altogether impossible to cleanse the River Aire of its impurities, and that no proof whatever can be adduced that the present polluted state of the River Aire has been injurious to the public health” (Sellers, 1997:6). The second option envisaged a ‘manure farm’ close to the outfall to raise revenue of £10,000 per annum, by using a portion of the sewage for agricultural purposes. “There were severe misgivings among others however about the viability of his plans for sewage utilisation, given the assumed toxic effect of some of the dyers’ wastes in the sewage and the advent of cheap Peruvian guano as an agricultural fertiliser” (Sellers, 1997:6). The third proposition avoided these uncertainties and led the sewage untreated to the river. The Council adopted this option in June 1846.

In the nineteenth century, serious concerns with regard to urbanisation, sanitation and the disposal of human residue emerged. Latham (1884, 1) commented on this situation:

“Wherever masses of human beings congregate, whether in towns or villages, or in armies in the field, camp, or barrack, an artificial existence, to a certain extent,

springs up. Each individual is no longer dependent upon himself; the habits of those around him influence his own position”.

The House of Commons in London had to be closed in the 1840s because of the stink from the Thames (Brooklyn College, 1999). Since the Industrial Revolution, the problem of the safe disposal of human waste has been a factor, particularly in urban areas. Expanding industries attracted rural inhabitants and their families to towns and cities. Public health and sanitation became priorities of city governments in Europe after 1870. Between 1738 and 1778 various designs were made to improve the water toilet until, in 1870, Helior invented the flush-type toilet, called *optims*, an improvement over the previous designs (Pathak, no date). Water closets were built in ever-increasing numbers. This necessitated the construction of treatment plants.

CONVENTIONAL SANITATION APPROACHES

Waterborne sanitation systems “reached hegemony in the 20th century and other systems were considered inferior by sanitation engineers and health professionals” (Schönning, 2001:30). Most contemporary approaches to sanitation focus on high-technology systems, particularly in localities where large concentrations of people are found. These technologies include conventional waterborne systems with oxidation ponds as treatment, vacuum systems or facilities capable of recycling effluent. Short-comings of this sewer system are summarised by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (GTZ, 2008):

- unsatisfactory purification or uncontrolled discharge of more than 90% of waste water world-wide;
- pollution of water by organics, nutrients, hazardous substances, pathogens, pharmaceutical residues, hormones;
- unbearable health risks and spread of disease;
- severe environmental damage and eutrophication of the water cycle;
- consumption of precious water for the transport of waste;
- high investment, energy, operating and maintenance costs;
- frequent subsidisation of prosperous areas and neglect of poorer settlements;
- loss of valuable nutrients and trace elements contained in excrements discharged into water;
- impoverishment of agricultural soils, increased dependence on chemical fertilisers.
- combined, central systems are predominant in organised waste-water disposal, resulting in problems with contaminated sewage sludge.

A critical feature in the provision of high technology systems is energy, particularly reliable energy supplies, in order to avoid hazardous conditions in and around pump stations, manholes, and low-lying areas. Settlements outside the major urban areas often experience power outages, which have a negative impact on the functioning of the sewer system. In the case of waterborne services, energy is required to pump water to reservoirs in order to have a storage system, which is needed to flush the toilets. Energy is also needed to pump the effluent over great distances from various pump stations to treatment works, which may also consume substantial amounts of energy. The generation of energy is also closely linked to climate change in South Africa, for example, where most of the electricity is generated by polluting coal-burning power stations. According to the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) (2009:3), water and energy are inextricably linked, because water and energy are essential to every aspect of life, including social equity, ecosystem integrity and economic sustainability. Water is used to generate energy and energy is used to provide water, as shown below. Water is used, inter alia, to generate energy in hydro- and thermal-electric power stations, and in fuel production, while energy is also used to treat wastewater, the process of treating drinking water and water usage.

Any conventional sewer systems require huge amounts of capital during the construction phase and also afterwards as part of maintenance and operations. This includes, inter alia, engineers to design the system, contractors to construct the network and then the technical and administrative structures to operate a system. For example, the first vacuum sanitation system installed in Namibia was valued at R20 million and 50 houses were connected out of a total of 1,462 erven, of which 642 were provided with a link to the system, but had not so far been connected (Wienecke, 2008:5).

Narain (2002) points out that, “The political economy of sewer systems is simply atrocious for developing countries. Hardly any poor city is able to recover its investments in sewer systems”. Around 80% of the potable water ends up as waste-water, which must be treated. The sewer systems often are a subsidised service for the rich to excrete in convenience. Narain (2002) argues that, with respect to paying "full costs", the “political economy of defecation is such that no democratic government will accept the hard fact that it cannot ‘afford’ to invest in modern sewage systems for its citizens. Instead, it continues to subsidise the users of these systems, in the name of the poor, who cannot afford these systems in the first place”. This therefore cannot be regarded as an appropriate option, because “Conventional sanitation concepts, based on flush toilets, a water wasting technology, are neither an ecological nor economical solution in both industrialized and developing countries” (Langergraber and Muellegger, 2005:433).

Appropriate technology

Napier, *et al.* (1987:1) define the term 'appropriate technology' as:

"technology that is appropriate to the needs of a particular society at its present level of development, since different cultural and geographic groups require different technologies. 'Technological self-determination' should harmonise with cultural identity and complement the needs of the community in a satisfying and creative process".

The definition also stresses that every society has a technological tradition and new technologies should not conflict with traditions. This however is not always possible, especially in cases where the communities demand those technologies used by the 'modern' strata of society. This relates to several aspects, such as attitudes, education, and policies. Waterborne sanitation can be regarded as the technology of the elites, who are often viewed as role models. Their lifestyle may influence demands made by those without access to such a technology or service. If demands and expectations expressed by voters and interest groups cannot be fulfilled at the local level, they are then requested from central government. These demands could then relate to ideological aspects, such as promoting equality between different income groups, irrespective of whether the demands are inappropriate or not. There are several possible reasons why inappropriateness is advanced. Examples of such reasons are: to gain political support, political favouritism, incompetence, established interests or corruption where a company bribes an official to buy its products or technology. Another is dependency on central government, as a result of legal requirements or due to political structures in a dominant party state, to receive funding, technical and administrative assistance.

The political discourse is usually determined by the ruling elites including established interests, but may run counter to the wishes at grassroots level. During the preparations for an informal settlement-upgrading project in Namibia, members of resident groups living in the targeted areas were invited to Windhoek for a workshop on alternative sanitation options. Afterwards they had to communicate with their communities to arrive at a decision on which system to use. These residents had a clear understanding of the high costs involved in waterborne systems and therefore preferred a dry sanitation unit. However, the Council decided on an inferior option

(VIPs) after a government official claimed during a meeting with the Council that the other options were not part of a government policy, one that was non-existent. This led to a situation where the target groups took an informed decision on a technical issue relating to appropriateness, which was disregarded by the ill-informed political elite.

Wang (1991:10) differentiates between three terms, which are often lumped together. The first is intermediate technology, an approach to development in which full industrial technology is eventually possible. The second term, appropriate technology was discussed above. Proponents criticise industrial technology as not being appropriate for poor communities, except for certain tasks. The third term, alternative technology, is a radical criticism of the excesses of the industrial society. By promoting alternative technology, its proponents seek to reform society by making use of technology that is environmentally sustainable, affordable, and that allows equity in the access to resources. The alternative to industrial technology should have aspects accommodating the needs of the rich and also the poor. The rich need a technology to allow them to achieve their desired living conditions without unnecessary depletion of natural resources, whereas the poor require technology suitable for their survival needs (Wang 1991, 11). These technologies should be affordable, simple and effective.

ARID ENVIRONMENTS AND SANITATION

Appropriate sanitation technologies in an arid environment relate to: (1) water conservation; (2) recycling of residue, either at household level (dry sanitation) or at bulk level (sewage plants); and (3) appropriateness to the local social and natural environment. Among the alternative sanitation technologies are, for example, biogas plants, which utilise ‘waste’ products. They are environment-friendly because they produce fertiliser and gas for cooking purposes, thereby eliminating the need for firewood. Biogas is usually associated with rural areas. However, in Maseru, Lesotho, a combination of sanitation provision and biogas is utilised by the top echelon of society such as university lecturers, architects, and government officials. One reason for this is that only about 10% of Maseru is connected to a waterborne system. In addition, there are high costs of pumping out the holding tanks and long waiting periods before the tanks are pumped out. One option offered is the construction of a biogas plant by a local organisation. This eliminates the pump costs, provides gas for cooking, and water for garden purposes. The savings made from pumping out and from harnessing gas for cooking will recoup all the costs of construction within a few years. These advantages have led to the acceptance of an alternative technology among the affluent members of society.

The question of appropriate technology can be illustrated by the provisions made in the Northern Cape Province. During research in the Kamiesberg Local Municipality, South Africa, in February 2009, the differences between the various settlements with regard to sanitation became evident. The larger urban areas, such as Garies and Kamieskroon, have waterborne sewers, whereas smaller settlements such as Kheis and Kharkams have several systems, such as urine diversion systems (UDS), ventilated improved pit-latrines (VIPs) and conservancy tanks (for those who can afford a flush toilet). The UDS was the first dry system that was installed and consisted of a toilet structure with a pit underneath and a pipe for liquids draining into the soil outside the unit. The second type of sanitation system was the VIPs. Unlike the usual design, which consists of a pit in the ground without a floor slab, the pits are constructed from cement blocks on a concrete slab. The top part of the pit is covered by a concrete slab, which makes provision for the pedestal. Due to the solid rock in the area, foundations could not be constructed. The units are built onto the rocks. A few steps lead to the upper part of the toilet, which includes the pedestal and surrounding structure. The most recent version has two pits, to allow for the drying out of the content, whilst the second pit is used. The movable pedestal inside the unit is placed above the utilised pit.

The appropriateness of a system needs to take local conditions into account. Arid regions are characterised by very limited water resources. The promotion of waterborne systems is therefore short-sighted and nonsensical, except to gather political votes. Furthermore, arid lands usually have nutrient-deficient soils. The advantage of dry sanitation systems is that what is termed human waste is, in fact, a fertiliser. UDS systems, which separate liquids and solids, in particular, offer two fertilisers namely urine and compost made from the solid residue. In the Kamiesberg Local Municipality very little consideration has been given to the re-use of the so-called “waste”. According to an official at the Kheis Municipality, people are responsible for the maintenance of the toilets. A few residents produce compost, while some use the few waterborne systems to discard of the solids. Residents in Kharkams and Kheis and an official in Garies confirmed that only a few residents have complained about the dry systems provided.

The Hull Street Project in Kimberley utilised a system developed more than 30 years ago in Sweden. The system is installed inside the house. A small fan ensures that no odours emerge from the toilet while in Namibia a toilet system was designed that ensures that the matter is gathered in special collecting containers to make emptying easy and hygienic (see Eco Solutions, 2012). A UDS was added in 2012, which reduces maintenance requirements. For installations inside a building, a fan should be added to ensure that air flow is guaranteed to dry out the content and to avoid odours.

The promotion of dry sanitation has to take into consideration that certain systems have limitations. For example, some toilets should be used only by a limited number of users per day. This necessitates that the number of users and the numbers of toilets are balanced in order to provide an acceptable service. In addition, the drying process has to be facilitated otherwise a damp mass will be created, which makes cleaning and maintenance an arduous task. An electric fan can support an odour free environment. In localities without electricity, effective micro-organisms (EM), ash, or building lime eliminate any odours.

Acceptability of an appropriate sanitation technology is usually dependent on the need for maintenance. Waterborne systems promote the “flush and forget” mentality, whereas differences exist in the case of dry sanitation systems. In certain cases, the residents are responsible, whereas in a few other cases a service provider is appointed. In the pits of the VIPs all solid matter is collected, whereas the UDS toilets drain the urine away from the unit. This creates the crucial problem of emptying the pits, which is at the heart of most complaints and aversion of dry systems. Irrespective of whether a waterborne or a dry system is available, the final treatment of the effluent or residue has to be considered.

The Kamiesberg Local Municipality and other waterborne sanitation providers utilise oxidation dams as treatment for its effluent. Sanitation is not integrated into a cycle of resource use – that is, a circular metabolism where available resources are used, as in the case of ecological sanitation (EcoSan). Education is required on all levels of society including the decision-makers in order to promote EcoSan. Education in content and process needs to reflect on society’s “unsustainable use of earth’s resources, inequity in access to resources and on economic forces and not just scientific and ecological issues” (Kakabadse, 1999:107).

What is often not understood is that the so-called “waste” found in toilets is a resource, as advocated by EcoSan. “EcoSan represents a holistic approach towards ecologically and economically-sound sanitation and is a systemic approach as well as an attitude” (Langergraber and Muellegger, 2005:435). The basic principles of ecological sanitation systems are the following: utilisation of available resources and saving water (circular metabolism), closing nutrient and water cycles with as little loss of material (nutrients) and energy as possible (Lechner and Langergraber, 2003:213). EcoSan is a philosophy rather than a technology. It

integrates several objectives including appropriate technologies, water conservation, fertiliser and food production.

EDUCATION

Education is associated with changing attitudes, behaviours, development planning, policy-making, health, natural resource usage and, in the case of alternative technologies, an understanding of non-conventional approaches and technologies. Education is not limited to formal schooling, but includes numerous other dimensions, such as non-formal, informal, experiential education and on-the-job-training. Another specialised educational task relates to hygiene, water and sanitation practices, and the linkages to health considerations. Astor (1988:19) argues:

“The aim of education is to change the attitudes and behavior of the target group by imparting new knowledge. In order for it to be effective, educational measures must be planned which are oriented towards specific learning goals and tailored to the unique cultural behavior of those being instructed. The aim is to modify existing ways of thinking and behaving in such a way that the community learns to solve certain problems itself and to take part in the development process. Educational measures must be given a long-term framework”.

Education should give beneficiaries useful information to make effective choices and to enable them to know what the opportunity cost (or what they will forego) will be of their decisions. In the case of alternative or new methods and technologies, an understanding is necessary about using, maintaining and operating them. There is a wide diversity of major groups to be educated, such as decision-makers, consumers, and water providers. In addition Agenda 21 states (UNCED 1992, §36.1):

“Education, raising of public awareness and training are linked to virtually all areas in Agenda 21, and even more closely to the ones on meeting basic needs, capacity-building, data and information, science, and the role of major groups”.

One lesson learnt from the Water for African Cities Programme, according to UN-Habitat (2003:201), is that water wastage cannot be reduced by pricing, technical or regulatory measures alone. What is needed includes advocacy, the raising of awareness and education. The latter refers to value-based education, which is,

“... an innovative approach to water education that not only seeks to impart information on water, sanitation and hygiene, but also inspires and motivates learners to change their behaviour and attitudes that promote the wise and sustainable use of water”.

The value-based approach seeks to nurture values such as responsibility, sharing and caring, by starting with children. This is, however, not sufficient, as adults are often the role models, whose irresponsible behaviour can leave a lasting impression on children. Allocating specific capital and operational budgets to communities, and requiring them to decide what to spend this money on, could provide a focus for community based decision-making. Water education should aim to promote an understanding of water as a key social, economic and environmental resource, in addition to facilitating a new water management ethic (UN-Habitat, 2003:201). This education has to be offered through formal, non-formal, and informal channels of learning. The main activities under the Water Education Initiative in African Cities include (UN-Habitat, 2003:202):

- the development of a water-related environmental education strategy;
- establishment of water classrooms (Water classrooms are used for teaching on how to use local materials and local resources for providing access to water and sanitation facilities to all human settlements (UN-Habitat, 2003);
- schools water audit;
- water quality education;
- curriculum development;
- introducing water education in schools;
- non-formal education in communities;
- water health education;
- information exchange;
- North-South twinning arrangements.

As part of the initiative, two issues are of concern: (1) sanitation issues need to be de-stigmatised; and (2) public awareness campaigns need to take account of the diverse water and sanitation circumstances in urban areas (UN-Habitat, 2003:202). Most governments and development agencies often champion water but not sanitation. As a consequence, sanitation is relegated to the bottom of the agenda and work plans of agencies and governments. This requires a de-stigmatisation of sanitation in order to raise its profile in the arena of public debate. Campaigns for water and sanitation have to consider the different conditions, needs, and circumstances of users. This requires an assessment of usage habits and the determination of practical and socially-accepted approaches. UN-Habitat (2003:202) emphasises “access to water and sanitation for low-income groups”, because new investments in water and sanitation do not always reach the poor (UN-Habitat, no date a).

The role and the consumption of higher-income groups should not be neglected. Owing to their incomes, they can afford expensive sanitation services and substantial amounts of water for gardening, swimming pools, and also for wasteful habits such as washing cars, using hose pipes, cleaning pavements, and waterborne sanitation. These circumstances necessitate the education of all water consumers – residents, politicians, industries, civil- society organisations, and the media - to promote water saving and conservation. In other words, this must be applied to all segments of society not only the so-called poor. In addition, education has to be related to the usage of compost made from human faeces, food production, and health. What is needed, according to Higher Education Partnership for Sustainability (HEPS) (HEPS, 2004:9), is sustainable literacy. Expressed at the highest level, a ‘sustainability- literate’ person would be expected to:

- understand the need for change to a sustainable way of doing things, both individually and collectively;
- have sufficient knowledge and skills to decide and act in a way that favours sustainable development; and
- be able to recognise and reward other people’s decisions and actions that favour sustainable development.

This requires an understanding of the need for change, individually and collectively. Literate persons will be equipped with a number of intellectual and practical tools that enable them to take decisions and act in a way that is likely to contribute to this change (HEPS 2004, 9). Only if this understanding is available on the decision-making levels can relevant policies support these efforts. One example is the interest shown by a former Namibian government Minister in alternative sanitation. After receiving information on the various alternative sanitation options, he compiled an article, which was published in the government newspaper under the headline “‘Ecological Sanitation’ Could Replace Bucket Toilet System” (New Era, 22 May 2009, 6).

Closely linked to education are the psychological aspects. One important mental condition plays a role with regard to sanitation - phobia. Oxford Dictionaries (2013) define 'phobia' as: "an extreme or irrational fear of or aversion to something", whereas Merriam-Webster (2013a) describes it as an exaggerated, usually inexplicable, and illogical fear of a particular object, class of object, or situation. Winblad and Simpson-Hérbert (2004:7) distinguish between 'faecophobic' and 'faecophilic' cultures. "Faecophobia is a personal or cultural response to the fact that human faeces are malodorous and potentially dangerous" (Winblad and Simpson-Hérbert, 2004:100). The authors also point out that Chinese farmers have, for thousands of years, returned excreta to the soil, fresh or composted. In China human excreta was, and is, therefore considered a valuable product about which rural people have no problems talking or smelling, or handling. This culture is termed 'faecophilic'.

Jenkins (2005:125) underscores that this should provide a fairly convincing testimony about the usefulness of human "waste" as an agricultural resource. These examples also illustrate that micro-organisms, health and hygiene can be addressed in such a way that benefits are derived from these alternatives, e.g. gas and fertilizer. Such disposal requires supplementary education on how to utilise the residue. Describing recycled or recyclable materials as 'waste' "is an unpleasant semantic habit that must be abandoned" (Jenkins, 2005:8). Winblad and Kilama (1980:22) propose that "waste" is a misleading term for excreta, kitchen refuse, crop and garden leavings. Therefore the term "waste" should in this case be replaced by "residue", because they are natural resources.

Alternative sanitation approaches have the additional benefit that they are decentralised systems that can be managed by communities or even households. They do not necessarily require municipal involvement, although the local authority should be informed and educated about these activities. The lower costs of alternatives mean that the dependence on central or regional government can be reduced with respect to technical and financial dependencies that are often the result of inappropriate technologies, such as vacuum systems in the 'bush'. Two positive examples may suffice. In Otjiwarongo, Namibia, a local NGO is managing the dry sanitation systems on behalf of the municipality by emptying the containers on a regular basis. The municipality pays for this service by deducting a fee of R10 per month from the users. At Kimberley's Hull Street Project, a Section 21 company is responsible for the maintenance of the UDS systems installed in the houses. These services are less expensive compared to those of the municipality, as residents do not have to pay for water used in flush toilets and no fees have to be paid for the maintenance of an expensive sewer network, the treatment and final disposal.

Besides the experiences in Asia, one approach to teach residents and officials the operations and management of alternative systems is to raise awareness that alternatives exist. Demonstration units at communities and at offices provide opportunities to test these options. In Namibia, the Habitat Research and Development Centre (HRDC) demonstrates numerous alternative sanitation systems, especially those that are suitable under arid conditions. Visitors are informed about the various options and are able to use and examine the units. In other words, seeing is believing. The involvement of the media such as television, radio, and the printed media, supports these efforts of education and reaches a larger audience. One example is the widespread assumption that only water-borne systems do not smell or are the only option with respect to hygienic toilets. At the HRDC this erroneous perception has been shown to be untrue. It is the management of any sanitation systems that determines whether it is hygienic or not. Bad management always results in obnoxious conditions, whether the system used is wet or dry. In this informal way, education fulfils the role of showing evidence that communities or households can use to decide what they would like to use, instead of relying on a top-down approach, where distant officials decide which type of sanitation a community should receive.

CONCLUSION

Waterborne sanitation was invented in areas with sufficient water resources. It is inappropriate in water scarce areas. The obsession with waterborne sanitation usually illustrates the absence of education, political will, and the misunderstanding of alternatives, which results in a waste of available resources, such as finances and water. Suitable alternative technologies and approaches are either not disseminated, understood, or are simply disregarded. This is of particular importance in the light of the already limited water resources. Southern Africa is not as “water-rich” as those countries where waterborne sanitation originated. In addition, human resources to operate and maintain these systems are often limited, as illustrated in the 2009 Green Drop Report (Department Water Affairs, 2009).

There are several examples throughout Southern Africa of projects which have utilised alternative systems in South Africa, Lesotho or Namibia. The author of this paper has been using several dry systems for ten years without any problems. Understanding how a system works and how to maintain it, is essential. The lack of sanitation can be addressed by identifying a suitable option for a particular locality. This must be supported by intensive educational activities such as demonstration units, to convince beneficiaries and local governments that these options are indeed feasible and appropriate systems. There are numerous dry sanitation systems available, which means that a choice can be made and can challenge the hegemony of waterborne sanitation.

The sensible utilisation of water resources is crucial for any living organism in arid regions, particularly in the long-term. The reliance on water in dry lands involves the consideration of the characteristics of a boom-and-bust ecology that is, the variations in rainfall, plant growth and the limited carrying capacity. The efficiency and effectiveness of plants and animals, living in arid regions, to conserve and utilise water, are much more sophisticated than any comparable anthropogenic action or technology. The misuse of water by humans has been documented over the last centuries in terms of polluting potable water as part of sanitation provision. This needs to be discouraged. One possibility includes the promotion of alternative sanitation systems in order to recover natural resources. Winblad and Simpson-Hérbert (2004:100) sum up the key obstacle that an EcoSan programme must overcome: the understandable and in some ways rational fear of human excrement. It is usually forgotten that the latter is merely digested food. Sanitation provides several options that can be utilised in the scramble for natural resources: water, compost or fertiliser, and biogas.

The question is, how the provision of sanitation could and should be realised by taking into account the arid conditions in Southern Africa. Education and cultural aspects play a significant role in the acceptability of alternative sanitation systems and the re-use of the resources. Education should serve as an important starting point to aim at the psychological aspects of change in tandem with practices such as EcoSan. What is needed is to disseminate experiences and information about alternative sanitation to all levels of society to achieve a well-informed understanding of all issues. However, there is no one perfect sanitation system. An appropriate solution has to be based on local conditions.

Inappropriate technologies, such as waterborne sewer systems, are widely spread and promoted by established interests. Those with such positions of vested interest rarely consider innovative concepts, such as ecological sanitation, in development planning and education. Attitudes need to be changed in order to get rid of conformity and to allow local decision-making on a full understanding of the relevant facts. Alternative technologies are not only for the so-called poor or disadvantaged groups. They are relevant to all strata of society. In drylands the scarcity of water is of crucial importance in the provision of services. To continue to promote waterborne sanitation systems seems preposterous.

What can be done depends on the local conditions? There are however some general principles that could be considered and where water, or the lack thereof, is a major determinant:

Principle	Option(s)
Reduce the production of effluent	do not promote waterborne sanitation
Re-use available effluent	biogas, ecological sanitation
Do not produce any effluent	dry sanitation (UDS, composting)
Education	Awareness raising, attitude change, practical demonstrations of alternatives, understanding, behavioural change

Preventing the production of effluent is the cheapest way of managing it. Sanitation without water is possible. In arid regions this should become the principal consideration in the planning of services for all sectors of society. Alternative sanitation will be acceptable to lower income groups, once the prosperous segment of society also invests in and uses these alternatives. How can the problem with alternatives be summarised? A “problem” is “a question raised for inquiry, consideration, or solution ... a source of perplexity, distress, or vexation” (Merriam-Webster, 2013b). The problem in sanitation relates to psychological factors: attitudes, perceptions, culture, and lack of appropriate education. The planning of services has to focus on the whole community, and not just on the poor, otherwise alternative sanitation will always appear second-rate. In the words of Latham (1884, 3):

“In the prosecution of sanitary works we have discovered a real philosopher’s stone, for such works have been abundantly shown to have added to the average duration of life, and in the utilization of those waste products which have hitherto been looked upon as dirt, rich and golden harvests have been, and still will be, produced”.

In other words, water AND sanitation are valuable natural resources if not contaminated.

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
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BOOK REVIEW

By D. Lewis

Makuwira, Jonathan. 2014. *Non-Governmental Development Organizations and the Poverty Reduction Agenda: The Moral Crusaders*. London and New York: Routledge, 2014. 184 pages. ISBN 978-0-415-70444-1

Non-Governmental Development Organizations and the Poverty Reduction Agenda: The Moral Crusaders by Jonathan Makuwira

This concise and finely-written book is the latest contribution to the extensive, but still somewhat patchy academic literature that exists on the wide ranging subject of NGOs and International Development. In the book's six substantive chapters, the author considers: the background to development NGOs' (or non-governmental development organizations, NGDOs as the author prefers) work in the context changing 'aid modalities', the growing centrality of the concept of 'partnership' within aid relationships, the case for the capacity development of NGOs, the problems NGOs face in relation to accountability, the challenges of leadership and management in the NGO sector and finally the importance of organizational learning in the work that development NGOs undertake.

The first question that many prospective readers might ask is: 'Do we need another book about NGOs?' This one makes several claims to distinguish itself. Firstly, the identity and prior experience of its author makes this one different from many books of this kind. Makuwira began his career in Malawi's Ministry of Education as a trainer of teachers and has extensive experience working with that country's NGO sector, lending his analysis a distinctively-informed perspective from the Global South. Secondly, this book eschews the more familiar ground of focusing only on the international NGO sector. Instead its focus is in favour of taking a grassroots NGO perspective and engaging with NGOs set up and run by 'locals', a perspective that has arguably been neglected in earlier literature. Thirdly, the book argues for a normative agenda: "by challenging the orthodoxy seemingly entrenched in the minds of many in the development field, academia and research institutions" (p.3).

NGOs can challenge the dominant discourse, the author suggests, by being more grounded in the interests and realities of local partners and communities, by resisting the pressures to simply become the agents of neoliberal agendas and by focusing their work towards national government poverty reduction priorities. Finally, the book is informed by a distinctively moral perspective in the way that it approaches its agendas. Makuwira uses phrases throughout such as ‘the moral case for partnerships’, ‘the moral dilemma of accountability’, and the ‘moral development crusade’ of NGOs. This approach is refreshing because of the strong emphasis it places on the importance of the values and beliefs that underpin NGO work. For example, use is made in the framing of these arguments in relation to the World Congress of NGOs’ 2007 Toronto Declaration of Core Values.

All of the above makes very good sense. NGOs have long been under pressure to professionalise and become more like public or private sector organizations, which risks eroding this value-based identity and a resulting loss of credibility. Furthermore, the lessons that are presented at the end of the book raise some important points for further exploration by other academics or policy makers. These points include: the need to seek alternative resource mobilization strategies, confronting the power dynamics to make partnerships more effective and experimenting with peer learning in ways that challenge the assumptions and relationships taken for granted between local and international staff.

As in many books on NGOs, the tension between the normative agendas being advanced and the evidence base that informs knowledge remains a difficult one to reconcile, often resulting in the provision of well-meaning but ultimately unrealistic and difficult to implement recommendations. This is largely avoided in this case through the author’s access to some original, Southern-focused insights, such as the use of Deborah Ajulu’s work on a holistic approach to power that highlights the powerlessness not just of people living in poverty but also of the developers themselves.

Criticisms of NGOs in relation to questions around their effectiveness, accountability and coordination are common these days. This book goes some way to reclaiming the moral high ground for NGOs. However, this reviewer would not have used the word ‘crusader’, with its connotations of religious conflict, in the title of a book about rebalancing global relationships and international solidarity in a post 9/11 world.

Overall, this book more than delivers on its promise to provide “a platform to rethink the future of NGOs and their development endeavours,” (p.163), by presenting a stimulating argument, a thorough review of the literature, good use of visual materials and a wide ranging set of examples from the field. Jonathan J. Makuwira is to be congratulated on bringing some important new ideas to the discussion of NGOs and development, which allows a more critical discussion of the complex relationships between international and grassroots NGOs. This volume is highly recommended to researchers, students and development practitioners everywhere.

Reviewer: David Lewis is a Professor of Social Policy and Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. David Lewis specialises in international development policy and management, with a particular focus on South Asia and on civil society and NGO issues. Recent books include: *Bangladesh: Politics, Economy and Civil Society* (Cambridge University Press, 2011) and *Nongovernmental Organizations, Management and Development* (Routledge, 2014).

JDL JOURNAL POLICIES

Aims and scope

The Journal for Development and Leadership (JDL) is a double peer-reviewed journal of the Faculty of Business and Economic Sciences at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. This journal is aimed at providing practical guidance and empirical evidence to researchers and practitioners specialising in Business and Economics and related fields.

The journal provides a communication forum to advance entrepreneurship, innovation, small business management and various disciplines in Business and Economics, as well as the application of the disciplines in practice. Its aim is the improvement and further development of these fields and it is designed to appeal to academics, researchers and practitioners.

A double-blind review process is followed, supported by a national and international Editorial Associate Editors Peer Review Board.

Full academic accreditation will be applied for at the DoHE when the set requirements have been met.

The mission of the Journal for Development and Leadership (JDL) is to be a dynamic and internationally-recognised academic journal of excellence that will stimulate sustainable development and leadership by generating and disseminating of cutting-edge knowledge and understanding.

It is envisaged that the JDL will serve as a platform for presenting information central to the concerns of academics, researchers and practitioners. In this manner, research will grow and simultaneously shape theories for future application in the relevant societal contexts.

The journal is published bi-annually, in June and December by the Faculty of Business and Economic Sciences of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University.

The views expressed in the journal are those of the respective authors.

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Editorial policy

The editorial policy includes taking cognisance of the journal's objective to advance all disciplines, fields and sub-fields within the Faculty of Business and Economic Sciences, such as those mentioned above and, in addition, the advancement of entrepreneurship, innovation, small business development, among others, as well as the application of the various, relevant disciplines in practice.

The primary purpose of the journal is to publish research articles in the various fields, to disseminate information and to serve as a publication vehicle for academics, researchers and practitioners. For example, practical papers, empirical papers, new approaches and techniques, case studies, and conceptual papers will be considered for publication, as well as book reviews and, when appropriate, conference papers.

Review process and proofing

The decision of the Editorial Committee to publish a given article is based on the judgement of the reviewers, who are all knowledgeable in their respective fields.

Authors will be informed of the committee's decision, including any relevant comments, after the article had been reviewed. Neither authors nor reviewers are identified in the review process.

Submission requirements

When submitting articles, authors have to agree that:

- They have not submitted and will not submit their article to another entity while the article is under review at JDL.
- They will only submit articles and empirical reports that have not been published previously.
- Their articles are prepared according to the prescribed style of JDL.
- Articles that have not been appropriately prepared according to the set guidelines will be returned to the authors prior to peer-reviewing.

Format

Font and font size should be Arial or Times New Roman in 12 pt

font size. The margins should be 3cm left, 2cm right and 2.54 top and bottom of each page.

Abstract

The abstract should consist of approximately 200 words, should be in single spacing and should be in italics.

Keywords

Authors should identify up to five keywords, separated by a semi-colon on the title page that characterise the principal themes covered by the paper.

Language

Papers should be written in English (preferably South African English). (In MS Word go to Tools, Language, Set Language and then select "English, South Africa".)

Title page

This page should contain the title of the article and the name, affiliation, full address and contact information of every author. If the article is co-authored, then the name of the author to whom correspondence should be sent has to be marked with an asterisk (*).

Body

The article has to be typed on one side of the page only in 1.5 line spacing. Appropriate headings and sub-headings should be used to segment the article to enhance readability. The length of the article should not exceed 10 000 words of typed text (approximately 30 type-written A4 pages).

Headings

Headings and sub-headings should not be numbered. All headings have to be formatted in bold upper case, and sub-headings in bold lower case (for example, using initial capitals and the rest lower case). Sub-sub headings should be in regular lower case.

Manuscript contents

Articles should include: abstract, introduction, identification of a problem, aims of the study, method and sample, measuring instruments, procedure, followed by interpretation and articulation of the results.

A conclusion has to be provided at the end of the article followed by a bibliography and possibly annexures (appendices).

Tables and figures

Tables and figures should be applied in the text, as close as possible and relevant to the appropriate explanation. They should be numbered consecutively in Arabic numerals.

Captions above tables and figures should be flush with margin and in bold and lower case.

Sources below tables and figures should be flush with margin (not bold) and in lower case.

Ethics and plagiarism

Turnitin software can be used for the prevention of plagiarism. The software checks submissions against millions of published research papers, documents on the web, and other relevant sources.

The chief goal of the JDL ethics policy is to provide advice for authors and to maintain the scholarly integrity of the JDL journal.

Authors should be familiar with the JDL ethics policy before submitting articles for possible publication. This is to guide authors to submit only original work to the JDL.

It is accepted that most incidents of plagiarism, redundant publication and copyright infringement occur because of a lack of understanding and not through fraudulent intent.

Copyright

The copyright of each article that is published resides with the NMMU.

Copy-editing

Manuscripts accepted for publication after peer review will be copy-edited for clarity, conciseness, and conformity with journal style.

Errata

Errata relate to the amendment of mistakes contained in the journal in editing or production, including errors of oversight and other omissions.

If there is an error in a figure or table, the usual procedure is to publish a sentence of rectification. A significant error in the figure or table is corrected by publication of a new corrected figure or table as an erratum in a follow-up edition.

Referencing

The Harvard Style of reference is used (see below). All publications cited in the text should be listed alphabetically by the surname of the first author in the bibliography at the end of the paper.

A bibliography (alphabetical, by author's last name, including initials) should be placed at the end of the article. Authors should ensure that there is a complete reference for every citation in the text and that the cited dates and the spelling of authors' names in the text and the references are consistent. A bibliography also includes other consulted sources not necessarily cited in the text.

Citations

The most recent publications on the topic should be cited, particularly those of the last 5 years, although the inclusion of older publications is acceptable, if appropriately applicable within the relevant context.

Full stops and no spaces between initials in prelims list, article opener - for example: Professor H.R. Lloyd;

After abbreviations - no full stops after abbreviation that ends in the final letter of the word - for example: 'Dr'

References in text

Up to 6 authors: use all names at first mention, thereafter use '*et al.*'

Use ampersand (&) between authors' names when between brackets.

In the text, comma after author's name, space after colon - for example: (Lloyd, 2008: 123).

Providing of page numbers is mandatory.

In the bibliography, no parentheses around the year except in the case of 'nd' for 'no date supplied'.

Full stops between initials - see below.

Book and article titles: use upper case only for the first letter of the titles, and not for the first letter of the subtitle after the colon.

Style for dates - all dates in UK/SA style, e.g. 24 June 2008. Use this in every instance, in the text and in the references.

Examples of references in text**One author:**

Brown (2010)

(Brown, 2010: 54)

Two authors:

Brown and Black (2011)

(Brown & Black, 2011: 89)

Three or more authors:

Black, Brown and White (2013: 45)

Black *et al.* (2013: 65)

Same author, different dates:

Black and White (2011, 2012)

Same author, same date:

Brown (2012a: 15, 2012b: 33)

Different authors:

(Black, 2013; Brown & White, 2012)

Examples of references in the Bibliography**Book:**

White, A.B. & Snow, R.J. 2012. *Organisational psychology (3rd Ed.)*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Edited book, chapter:

Brown, J.J. 2010. Personnel assessment. In A.K. Black & J.B. White (Eds), *Handbook of industrial psychology* (pp. 35-388). New York: Wiley.

No author:

A manual of style. 2013. Palo Alto, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Journal article:

Black, P.P. 2009. Employment testing: old theories and new research findings. *Journal of Human Performance*, 9(1): 130-145.

Internet:

Brown, T.P. 2012. *Cityproject*. Available online at:

<http://www.larcities.com> [Accessed 6 January 2013].

(*Urbanisation*, 2011. Available online at: <http://wwwurbancit.com>

[Accessed 15 August 2012].

Black, C.J. & Brown, A.M. 2012. Coordinating family and school.

Adolescence, 3(1). Available online at: <http://www.school.com> [Accessed 10 May 2013].

Quotations & Quotation Marks

Use double quotation marks.

Single quotation marks are used within double quotation marks.

Numbers

For numbers 1-10 within the text, words must be used.

For numbers 11 onwards, use numerals.

Use spaces instead of commas between hundreds, thousands and millions.

Use the decimal point rather than the comma.

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Where and how to submit

Articles should be submitted in MS Word format via e-mail to:

naas.ferreira@nmmu.ac.za / Telephone: +27 (0) 41-504 4607 or

rosalind.petrakis@nmmu.ac.za / Telephone: +27 (0) 41-504 2906

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